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1. Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed an increasing degree of tension in 
relations between central and local government as successive 
governments have sought to assert greater control over local 
authoritiesq expenditure and activities as part of wider economic 
and political programmes. Most attention has focused on attempts 
to control local government expenditure in the context of macro- 
economic policies but in more recent years financial controls 
have been supplemented by legislative measures affecting the 
fundamental role and responsibilities of local authorities. 
Indeed, some commentators have argued that the measures 
introduced by the Conservative governments since 1979 represent 
a fundamental restructuring of central-local relations such as 
to constitute a threat to the future of local government. 1 
Within the broader context far-reaching changes have been made 
affecting the financing and provision of local transport services 
and facilities. Takentogether, these changes have fundamentally 
re-structured the basis upon which local authorities provide for 
the transport needs of their areas. Our research has focused 
essentially on the effects of this re-structuring with the 
primary objective of assessing the impact on local authoritiesq 
transport expenditure and outputs and on their approach to 
addressing local transport problems and needs. 
Of particular interest to our research are changes which have 
been made to the Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) system. TSG 
was introduced in 1975/6 as a block grant to support both current 
and capital expenditure on roads and public transport thus 
supplementing Rate Support Grant (RSG) in respect of current 
expenditure and authoritiesq borrowing in respect of capital 
expenditure.' TSG was seen as providing the new county councils 
with the means to undertake their responsibilities for integrated 
and co-ordinated planning of public and private transport. 
However, following the election of the Conservative government 
in 1979 there was an increasing degree of conflict between 
central and local government over the nature of the outputs, and 
the expenditure consequences of, such integrated and co-ordinated 
planning, especially in London and the metropolitan areas. As 
part of a wider programme to bring local authoritiesq transport 
spending under control and more into line with the Government's 
transport policies and objectives, the TSG system was reformed 
in 1985/6, grant support being restricted to capital expenditure 
on roads deemed to be "of more than local importanceqq. 
A specific objective of our research, then, has been to assess 
the implications of this reform of the TSG system for local 
authoritiesq ability to address effectively their transport 
needs. However, it is clear that this reform must be examined 
in the context of a wide range of measures introduced since 1979 
which have affected local government finance in general, and the 
financing of local transport expenditure in particular. Thus, 
relevant legislative measures include the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act 1980, the Local Government Finance Act 
1982, the Rates Act 1984, the Transport Acts of 1983 and 1985, 
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the London Regional Transport Act 1984, and the Local ~overnment 
Act 1985. Indeed, these measures can be seen as part of the 
Conservative government's broader economic and political 
programme embodying the objectives of reducing the role of the 
public sector and , conversely, providing the conditions for a 
flourishing and prof itable private sector. Recent legislation 
to reform the systems of local government finance and to impose 
compulsory competitive tendering upon local authorities in 
respect of certain services can be seen as representing a 
strengthening of this programme. 
From such a perspective we are presented with a complex 
analytical task. In particular, it is extremely difficult to 
isolate the effect of any one measure, such as the reform of the 
TSG system, from the effects of the broader systems for control 
of local authorities' current and capital expenditure. In 
addition, the situation is complicated by the abolition of the 
GLC and metropolitan counties and the deregulation of local bus 
transport. We have not attempted, in fact, to undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of these latter measures but rather to 
assess their impact relative to the changes in finance of local 
transport expenditure. 
Our research programme has comprised three main stages. The 
first stage involved a review of relevant changes in central 
government policies and financial control mechanisms over the 
past decade in order to identify major research issues. The 
second stage focused on these issues in an analysis of trends in 
local authorities' transport expenditure relative to the 
Government's spending plans and provision over the period since 
1979/80, which attempted to identify impacts of central 
government policies and controls for more detailed examination. 
The third stage undertook this more detailed examination on the 
basis of information provided by a small sample of English local 
authorities selected to represent a range of socio-economic and 
political  context^.^ During this stage we focused on two main 
areas of local transport expenditure: firstly, capital 
expenditure on the construction and improvement of local roads 
since the reform of the TSG system in 1985/86; and, secondly, 
expenditure on the maintenance of local roads over the period 
since 1979/80. In both cases we were concerned to assess the 
implications of the reform of the TSG system in the context of 
broader systems for central government control of local 
authorities' spending, and to assess the implications for the 
ability of local authorities to address effectively the transport 
problems and needs of their areas. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the findings and 
conclusions of our re~earch.~ In the next section we review 
changes in central government policies and expenditure controls 
of relevance to local transport and we examine the record of 
government control of local transport expenditure since 1979. 
Section 3 summarises the analysis of roads capital expenditure 
and Transport Supplementary Grant since 1985/86 and section 4 the 
analysis of local road maintenance. Finally, section 5 discusses 
the main findings and conclusions of our research. 
-. . 
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2. Chancres in Government Policies and Expenditure controls 
2.1 Earlv Experience with Transvort Supplementarv Grant 
Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) was introduced in 1975 
following the reorganisation of local government to promote the 
concept of comprehensive and integrated l~cal~transport planning 
which had been behind the 1968 Transport Act. TSG was intended 
to promote a more rational and effective use of resources than 
had been achieved by the previous system of specific grants. In 
particular, it was designed to achieve four objectives. 
i. To promote the development and execution of 
comprehensive transport plans by the new county 
councils and the GLC; 
ii. To eliminate bias towards capital or current 
expenditure or towards particular forms of expenditure; 
iii. To distribute central government grants in a way that 
reflects as far as possible the needs of individual 
areas ; 
iv. To reduce the degree of detailed supervision by central 
government over individual schemes. 
TSG was paid to local authorities as a supplementary block grant 
to 'top up' resources provided through Rate Support Grant (RSG) 
and could be used at the discretion of local authorities to 
support both current and capital expenditure on highways and 
public transport. All county councils had to submit annual bids 
for TSG in Transport Policies and Programme (TPP) documents which 
placed such bids in the context of authorities' transgort 
policies and a proposed five-year programme of expenditure. 
In a review of the operation of the TSG system up to 1979 Mackie 
(1980) concluded that in comparison with the system of specific 
grants which it replaced, it had been relatively successful in 
meeting three of the above objectives but had failed in terms ofp 
ensuring the allocation of resources on the basis of need. 
Mackie also pointed out deficiencies arising from the annual 
basis of TSG settlements and the lack of longer term financial 
guidance, and was critical of the degree of central government 
intervention in local decision-making on the grounds that it 
blurred responsibility for local decisions, reducedthe scope for 
learning from diversity in local government, and discriminated 
against authorities which pursued open policy differences with 
central government. 
To a large extent the failure of the TSG system to ensure 
resource allocation on the basis of need was due to the change 
in economic conditions in the mid 1970s. The original purpose 
of TSG was to encourage higher spending to meet certain transport 
objectives and, as an unhypothecated grant, it strengthened local 
authorities1 autonomy and discretion. However, as public 
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expenditure restraints were imposed following the ~abour 
Government's recourse to the IMF in 1976, the major concern of 
central government was to achieve control over local authority 
spending. The result was a growing tension, not to say conflict, 
in central-local relations, specifically between, on the one 
hand, interests in the central state concerned to control local 
spending and, on the other hand, interests in the local state 
concerned to preserve local autonomy and discretion. 
In such a context of increasing tension in central-local 
relations a conflict of interests developed within the TSG 
system. The interest of central government was now to encourage 
transport lans which were economical in their demands on 
resources." However, in a situation of competitive bidding for 
limited resources, it was not in the interests of any one 
authority to develop a 'good cheap planf since they would risk 
thereby foregoing TSG altogether. On the contrary, it was in 
the interests of local authorities to submit high expenditure 
bids to attempt to maximise their share of TSG. With the 
development of such a conflict of interests the credibility of 
the TSG system as a rational resource allocation mechanism was 
increasingly undermined. 
The period since the election of the Conservative Government in 
1979 has been characterised by an escalation of conflict in 
central-local relations. To an increasing degree the interest 
of central government in achieving tighter control over local 
government spending has come into conflict with the interest of 
local government in retaining as much autonomy and discretion as 
possible in relation to expenditure decisions. This conflict has 
been manifested in new legislation affecting local g8vernment 
which 'I... has been passed at an unprecedented rate." In the 
next section we review briefly the main legislative and other 
measures which have been introduced by the Government and which 
have affected the scale and pattern of local authorities' 
transport expenditure and provision. 
Several commentators have referred to the significant increase 
in central government control over local authorities which has 
been achieved through changes in the system of local government 
since 1979. I' The Conservative Government elected in May 1979 
quickly addressed the objective of reducing local government 
spending, using exhortations to local authorities to reduce their 
budgets by 1979/80 immediately by 3%, and to plan for 1980/81 on 
the basis of a 5% reduction from the previous Labour Government's 
plans. l3 As it became clear that such reduction would not be 
forthcoming and that certain authorities were 'overspendingf by 
a significant amount, the Government focused increasingly on the 
inadequacies of the Rate Support Grant (RSG) system for 
controlling both local government spending in general and 
specific high spending authorities in particular. 14 
In this context the Government introduced the Local Government 
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Planning and Land Act 1980 which reformed the procedures 'for 
controlling local government current and capital expenditure, and 
introduced a competitive and commercial regime for local 
authorities' Direct Labour Organisations (DLOs). As regards 
current expenditure, a new system was introduced for distributing 
'block grant' between authorities and for controlling their total 
spending, replacing the former RSG system which was seen as 
rewarding high spending. The aim of block grant distribution is 
equalisation between authorities in terms of both need to spend 
and resources i.e. to ensure that, regardless of differences in 
their spending needs and rateable resources, all authorities of 
the same type are in a position to finance a comparable standard 
of service for the same rate poundage. 
This system is based upon two essential features. l5 First, a 
'grant-related expenditure' (GRE) is determined for each 
authority which is an estimate of the overall cost to an 
authority of providing a common standard of service taking into 
account variations in local circumstances and needs, the latter 
being expressed as a function of the number of 'clients' for the 
various services (or units of service required), and the unit 
cost of service provision, adjusted to take account of special 
factors affecting the cost of provision (eg population density, 
social problems). Secondly, an assessment is made of the extent 
to which each authority can finance its GRE from its own rateable 
resources. In order to equalise differences in rateable 
resources between authorities a 'grant-relatedt poundage (GRP) 
is calculated which specifies a common rate poundage which all 
authorities of the same type are assumed to levy for spending at 
the level of GRE. Each class of local authority has a 'GRP 
schedule' which specifies a GRP for levels of spending above and 
below GRE in such a way as to increase the assumed rate yield for 
authorities spending above GRE and to decrease it for those 
spending below GRE. Above a certain 'threshold' of expenditure 
(approximately GRE + 10%) the slope of the GRP schedule increases 
(the 'taper') in such a way as to have a large impact on higher 
spending authorities. 
As regards capital expenditure, the 1980 Act replaced the 
previous controls on borrowing (via 'loan sanctions') with 
controls on authorities' actual 'prescribed' expenditure in any 
year, however financed. Following submission of expenditure 
proposalstothe relevant Government departments, authorities are 
provided with 'block capital allocations' for each service. 
Initially there were five service blocks: housing, education, 
transport, social services and other services; in 1984 a sixth 
block for Urban Programme spending was added. Authorities are 
free to aggregate these block allocations to cover expenditure 
according to their own priorities, and there is a 10% 'carry 
over' provision from year to year. Also authorities may 
supplement their allocations with proportions of their capital 
receipts which are prescribed by the Secretary of State (broadly, 
20% of housing receipts and 30% of non-housing receipts in any 
one year). A 'cascading' principle applies such that the 
prescribed proportion of receipts can be used in the first year 
and the same proportion of what remains in each subsequent year. 
0. . - 
Therefore, authorities can gain spending power in any one year 
from capital allocations for that year, from up to 10% 'carry 
over' fromthe previous year and from prescribed proportions both 
of in-year capital receipts and of receipts accumulated from 
previous years. 16 
Since the implementation of the above approaches to control of 
current and capital expenditure in the financial year 1981/82, 
the Government has introduced various additional measures 
primarily aimed at increasing the degree of central control over 
authorities' current expenditure. Following early difficulties 
in achieving the desired reductions in local government 
expenditure the Government's Local Government Finance Act 1982 
introduced a system of expenditure targets and grant penalties 
and abolished the power of local authorities to raise 
supplementary rates or precepts. The target and penalty system 
was applied retrospectively to 1981/82 and operated each year 
until it was discontinued in 1986/87. It was not an integral 
part of the block grant system but rather wal? 'grafted on' to 
attempt to tighten up expenditure controls. Authorities' 
expenditure targets or 'guidance' were not derived from GREs but 
were designed simply to achieve volume reductions in total 
expenditure from previous years, reflecting the Government's 
public expenditure plans. Authorities which spent in excess of 
their targets suffered a reduction in block grant in accordance 
with a schedule of penalties which became more severe as the 
percentage overspending increased. Moreover, the severity ofthe 
penalty schedules increased over the years 1981/82 to 1985/86. 
Following severe criticism of the effects of the target and 
penalty system by the Audit Commission (1984) and the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee (1985) it was replaced in 
1986/87 with a modification to the basic block grant system which 
resulted in negative marginal grant rates with accelerated grant 
reductions for authorities exceeding the 'threshold' level of 
expenditure. 
Notwithstanding the effect of the target and penalty system some 
authorities continued to resist the Government's efforts to 
control spending by compensating for loss of grant through rate 
increases. The Conservatives' manifesto for the 1983 General 
Election contained proposals to limit rate increases by local 
authorities and also to abolish the GLC and metropolitan counties 
which were seen by the Government as the worst offenders in terms 
of 'profligate overspending', and as major obstacles to the 
achievement of control over local government expenditure. 19 
Following re-election, the Thatcher Government legislated in the 
Rates Act 1984 to impose limits on the rates of either specified 
local authorities ('selective rate limitation') or all local 
authorities ('general rate limitation'). The Government 
introduced the selective scheme in 1985/86 in respect of 18 
authorities (including the GLC, two metropolitan counties and 
nine London boroughs) whose expenditure was considered to be 
n...excessive having regard to the general economic 
conditionsw. 'O Since then, 31 authorities have been 'rate- 
capped' at some time, seven London boroughs having been 
designated every year. 
-. . 
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The progression of measures through the introduction ofthe block 
grant system, the super-imposition of the system of targets and 
penalties, the abolition of the power to raise supplementary 
rates and precepts and the introduction of 'rate-capping1 is 
indicative of a significant shift in the balance between central 
control and local autonomy and discretion in relation to 
expenditure decisions. The Government's recent legislation to 
reform the grants system and replace domestic rates with a 
'community chargeg- in the Local Government Finance Act 1988 - 
can be seen as the logical extension of a programme arising from 
the concern to curb high spending authorities and with the impact 
of local authority rates. A recent analysis of the impact of 
this legislation sees it as part of "...the reality of a 
tightening rein of central government control over local 
government s spending power and political voice. "" The 
Government is also proposing to introduce reforms of the present 
system of capital expenditure control to coincide with the 
introduction of the community charge in April 1990. These 
reforms would also tighten central control over local 
authorities' spending via more specific controls on individual 
authorities1 borrowing and use of capital receipts. 22 
2.3 Other Leaislation Affectins Local TranS~ort Provision 
There have been other legislative developments which have played 
an important role in the Conservative Government's programme for 
local government within the context of the broader economic 
programme of fiscal restraint, cuts in the burden of public 
expenditure and taxation, increased competition, deregulation of 
markets and privatisation. The primary measures of relevance to 
our discussion are the Transport Act of 1983 and the Local 
Government and Transport Acts of 1985. 
The context of the 1983 Transport Act was provided by the 
increasing concern on the part of the Government about the 
recalcitrance of some local authorities in the face of the 
Government's attempts to control their expenditure. The main 
'offenders' from the Government's point of view were Labour 
controlled authorities in London and the provincial metropolitan 
areas. A particularly important area of contention between such 
authorities and the Government was expenditure on public 
transport revenue support, with authorities such as the GLC and 
South Yorkshire and Merseyside MCCs providing levels of subsidy 
significantly in excess of the Government's plans. In 1982/83 
spending on revenue support by the GLC was 81% in excess of the 
Government's provision; the equivalent figure for the 
metropolitan counties was 70%. 
In the face of such resistance to broader expenditure controls, 
in particular to block grant penalties, the Government resorted 
to specific legislative provisions, in the context of legal 
confusion which had arisen out of the contradictory judgements 
following legal challenges to the low fares policies of the GLC, 
Merseyside and West Midlands metropolitan county councils." The 
stated purpose of the 1983 Transport Act was 'I.. .to provide a 
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more stable basis for public transport planning and subsidies in 
the Metropolitan Counties and London.'~~~ The Act provided for 
subsidies to be paid by Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) 
only on the basis of the Secretary of State's approval of their 
plans. The Secretary of State had the power to designate a 
maximum permissible level of grant in the form of a 'Protected 
Expenditure Level' (PEL); any authority exceeding its PEL would 
be open to challenge in the courts. 26 
In effect the 1983 Act provided the Government with an additional 
legislative basis for controlling local authority spending. 
According to Loughlin (1986), the Government was thereby able to 
present the imposition of constraints on authorities' expenditure 
as justified by a rational legal framework rather than as an 
outcome of controversial economic and social policies. 27 He 
argues that the concept of 'fiduciary duty' was used 
illegitimately to mask economic and political objectives because 
the concept is anachronistic, representing the incursion of a 
private law concept into a public law arena and is ambiguous and 
unworkable in relation to determining appropriate behaviour of 
local authorities. 28 
The Government claimed that the 1983 Act was successful in 
helping to restrain expenditure on public transport revenue 
support in the metropolitan areas. 29 However, although the 
Government cited evidence of a substantial reduction in budgets 
in the metropolitan areas from original plans, and there was a 
real terms reduction in expenditure in the metropolitan counties 
after 1982/83 (Figure lc) , there remains a question mark over the 
effectiveness of this legislation. The main problem was that 
with PELs the Government introduced a normative measure of 
expenditure which was not consistent with the 'traditional' 
measures of provision in the Public Expenditure White Paper and 
'accepted expenditure' for TSG support. Thus, in 1983/84 the 
total of PELS exceeded the Government's specific provision for 
revenue support by some £135 million on the grounds that: 
'I. . . past failure to tailor services to demand, inefficiency 
in operation and in some cases too low fares means that it 
will not be practicable to bring revenue support to the 
Passenger Transport Executives and London Transport in line 
with the Government's plans imrnediately.'~~~ 
However, as a result of this discrepancy the Government accepted 
for TSG support a level of spending on revenue support in 1983/84 
which was also in excess of the provision in the Public 
Expenditure White Paper as shown in Figure la. In previous years 
TSG accepted expenditure had been equal to or less than specific 
provision butthe introduction of PELs resulted in the Government 
providing grant support for 'over-spending' on revenue support 
by the GLC and metropolitan counties. This situation attracted 
the attention of the House of Commons Transport Committee which 
expressed its concern about the *I.. . apparent irrelevance of the 
measures contained in the 1983 Transport Act ...I8 and commented: 
I*. . . we find it most peculiar that the Government should 
..-. .. 
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appear to be sanctioning a level of expenditure which is 
totally at variance with its own targets ... 1131 
More recently Mackie (1987) concluded that If.. . the protected 
'I expenditure levels appear to have had only a limited effect . . . , 
partly because no legal action was taken against those 
authorities whichsZ exceeded their PELs (South Yorkshire and 
Merseyside MCCs) . Other authorities which remained within 
their PELs in effect received Government sanction, and some TSG 
support, for overspending relative tothe Governments expenditure 
provision. In the light of these effects it is possible to 
conclude that the 1983 Transport Act was a rather perverse piece 
of legislation. 
One reason why no legal action was taken against metropolitan 
authorities which exceededtheir PELs may have been the impending 
demise ofthe GLC and metropolitan counties. Following the local 
elections in May 1981 all these authorities came under Labour 
control and several of them subsequently figured prominently in 
the Government's list of 'recalcitrant overspenders', with 
expenditure on public transport revenue support being an 
important element in their conflict with the Government. Thus, 
on the introduction of expenditure targets and grant penalties 
in 1981/82 the metropolitan counties were budgeting collectively 
to overspend their targets by some 19% compared to a national 
(England) average of less than 6%." The GLC and South Yorkshire 
and Merseyside MCCs were among those authorities selected for 
'rate -cappingn in 1985/86 on the grounds that their total 
expenditure in 1984/85 exceeded their GRE by at least 20%. In 
South Yorkshire spending on public transport revenue support 
constituted some 42% of the authority's total budget for 1984/85 
and was approximately six fimes the level accepted by the 
Government for TSG purposes. 
The Conservatives' manifesto for the 1983 General Election 
included the commitment to abolish the GLC and metropolitan 
counties and proposals were publisheds5in a White Paper 
'Streamlining the Cities' later in 1983. The Government's 
justification for abolition referred mainly to the need for 
economy in the public sector and the absence of a real practical 
role for the upper tier of local government in the metropolitan 
areas. The search for a 'strategic role' by these authorities 
had resulted, it was maintained, in conflict uncertainty and 
'heavy and unnecessary burdens on ratepayers' .f6 In summary, the 
Government argued: 
"The abolition of these upper tier authorities will 
streamline local government in the metropolitan areas. It 
will remove a source of conflict and tension. It will save 
money, after transitional costs. It will also provide a 
system which is simpler for the public to understand, in 
that responsibility for virtually all local services will 
rest with a single authority."37 
The Local Government Act 1985 provided for the abolition of the 
GLC and metropolitan counties in March 1986 and from that date 
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their responsibilities were taken over by the metropolitan 
district councils (eg highways) or by 'joint boards' of nominated 
members from the district councils. In the event the main 
services (eg public transport, police, fire, waste disposal) 
became the responsibility of new joint authorities/boards whose 
members are nominated, not directly elected. This has resulted 
in severe criticism on the grounds that it has made the system 
more complex for the public to understand, not simpler as the 
Government has argued, reduced the scope for co-ordinated 
decision-making and reduced local accountability. 38 A study by 
Coopers and Lybrand fopd the Government's other justifications 
for abolition wanting. For example, it was concluded that the 
Government had exaggerated the degree of overspending by the 
metropolitan counties and that relatively high expenditure growth 
in these authorities was partly accounted for by higher inflation 
affecting their services, higher needs for services in 
metropolitan areas, and Government priorities for certain 
services (eg police) . 
The main issues highlighted by the Government in their abolition 
proposals - high levels of spending and conflict with central 
government policies - have been at the heart of the changing 
nature of central-local relations over the past decade, and the 
abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties can be seen as 
consistent with, indeed an integral part of, the Government's 
programme to restructuring those relations. Flynn et a1 (1985) 
argued as follows: 
"The proposals should be seen as an attempt by central 
government to gain further control of local government ... 
This centralization is part of a long-term trend towards a 
reduction in local autonomy and should be seen together with 
the Rates Act 1984 . . . as a further important step along the 
road towards a completely unitary state within which a 
single set of policies are pursued.w40 
Following the abolition of the GLC and MCCs, central government 
control over public transport expenditure and policies in the 
metropolitan areas was enhanced by subjecting the joint Passenger 
Transport Authorities (PTAs) to precept control for the first 
three years of their existence. The Secretary of State 
designated maximum expenditure levels (ELs) for each PTA and this 
system replaced the PELS of the 1983 Transport Act in 1986/87. 
In London, responsibility for public transport had been taken 
away from the GLC in June 1984 by the London Regional Transport 
Act which established London Regional Transport (LRT) as a 
nationalised industry subject to direct control of the Secretary 
of State. Consequently, in 1986/87 the Government had direct 
control over about 80% of total expenditure on public transport 
revenue support in England. As Mackie (1987) concludes: ''A 
substantial loss of local control, accountability and discretion 
has therefore occurred in the metropolitan areas.lt4' 
The objective of reducing expenditure by local authorities on 
public transport subsidies also lay behind the measures contained 
in the 1985 Transport Act to de-regulate local bus transport, 
-. . 
- 
allowing competition between operators in respect of services 
which can be provided on a commercial basis, and requiring local 
authorities to undertake competitive tendering in respect of 
supplementary services which they wish to secure but which remain 
unprofitable. 42 However, there were also other important 
objectives behind this legislation reflecting the Government's 
broader programme of de-regulating economic activity and 
privatising public sector activity and assets. 
As a result of this legislation, which took effect in October 
1986, all local authorities are no longer able to undertake 
comprehensive, co-ordinated planning of public transport service 
levels and fares for the whole of their areas and this has 
undermined their ability to allocate resources to public 
transport to achieve particular social objective. Thus, although 
concessionary fares schemes for the elderly, disabled and young 
people are permissible, general low fares policies to provide 
benefits for low income people generally are no longer possible. 
Moreover, it is now difficult for authorities to plan public 
transport services with respect to the objectives of minimising 
the social costs due to private vehicle use in urban areas. 43 
Therefore, it is possible to see, in the legislative measures 
which we have considered in this section, consistent themes 
derived fromthe Government's approach to local government within 
the context of a wider programme to reduce the scope of the 
public sector and its expenditure, increase competition, reduce 
state regulation of economic activity, and improve conditions for 
the profitability of the private sector. The primary feature of 
the Government's approach to local authorities has been the 
desire to enhance central control: control over levels of local 
spending in line with central expenditure plans: control overthe 
distribution of local spending in line with central plans and 
policies; and control in terms of eroding the power of local 
authorities to challenge and frustrate central government 
policies. This provides the context of the Government's reform 
of the TSG system which we can now consider in more detail. 
2.4 Reform of the Trans~ort Sup~lementarv Grant Svstem 
We have seen that by the time of the election of the Conservative 
Government in 1979 the TSG system was already subject to 
criticisms as a basis for national resource allocation. During 
the next half decade the system came under increasing pressure 
in the context of the Government's broader programme of measures 
to achieve tighter control over the level and composition of 
local authorities' expenditure. Fundamentally, the problem can 
be seen in terms of an increasing degree of incompatibility 
between the purposes of the TSG system and the approach adopted 
by the Government to the control of local government spending. 
There were two aspects to this problem. First, as we argued 
above in section 2.1, the original purpose of TSG, to promote 
expenditure in relation to certain transport objectives, 
conflicted increasingly with the Government's concern to reduce 
the level of local authorities' expenditure. Second, the role 
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of TSG as an unhypothecated grant in protecting local 
authorities' autonomy and discretion in relation to the 
priorities for local transport expenditure, provided the basis 
for increasing conflict between local and central government over 
the composition of local transport spending. In a sense, in the 
context of the Government I s objectives and policies for local 
government in the early 1980s, TSG had become something of an 
anachronism representing an obstacle to the achievement of 
central control over local transport expenditure particularly in 
London and the metropolitan areas. 
The problem was highlighted by the House of Commons Transport 
Committee in their f i n n u  examination of the Government's public 
expenditure plans. In their reports of 1980 and 1981 the 
committee commented on the severity of the cuts being imposed by 
the Government on local transport expenditure and focused on two 
features in particular: first, the failure of local authorities 
to achieve cuts in public transport revenue support in line with 
the Government's policies; and, second, significant underspending 
by authorities on road capital programmes. The Committee was 
critical of the role of TSG in promoting this imbalance by 
providing local authorities with the 'I.. . freedom to transfer 
central government support for local transport expenditure ... 
from capital to current expenditure."45 They argued for a reform 
of the TSG system to provide an incentive to 1:~al authorities 
to achieve planned capital expenditure targets. 
In coming to this view, it would appear that the Committee was 
influenced by submissions on this matter by the British Road 
Federation (BRF) which was highly critical of the TSG system on 
the grounds that it provided local authorities with the 
discretion to use TSG as they wished regardless of the balance 
of current and capital expenditure in 'accepted expenditure'. 
Therefore, the BRF argued, TSG was being used to support 
overspending by authorities on revenue support, particularly in 
London and the metropolitan areas, at the expense of capital 
expenditure on roads. Moreover, the BRF argued that the shire 
counties faced particular difficulties because the system for 
allocating TSG left them with a relatively high proportion of 
capital expenditure to be financed by borrowing with debt charges 
having to be accommodated in revenue budgets which were subject 
to severe constraint due to the operation of expenditure targets 
and grant penalties. The BRF proposed, therefore, that TSG 
should be restricted to capital expenditure with all local 
authorities1 current expenditure on transport receiving support 
through block grant.47 This proposal was explicitlg supported by 
the House of Commons Transport Committee in 1984. 
In October 1984 the Government announced its decision to restrict 
TSG support to capital expenditure on highways and traffic 
regulation from 1985/86. The Government's rationale for this 
decision was stated as follows: 
I8TSG was intended to support local transport expenditure 
generally. But in recent years authorities have spent more 
on transport revenue expenditure (particularly on public 
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transport revenue support) than provided in the ~overnment's 
public expenditure plans, while they have underspent the 
provision fortransport capital expenditure. The Government 
wishesto concentrate the extra supportprovidedthrough TSG 
on highways capital expenditure which is of more than local 
importance, in particular investment on roads which form 
part of the primary route network of major through routes, 
important urban roads, and bypasses and relief roads which 
relieve communities of the effects of heavy through 
traffic. 
Therefore, from 1985/86 TSG was no longer available to support 
any current expenditure nor capital expenditure on car parks, 
non-road freight facilities, and public transport (the latter now 
being eligible only for grants under section 56 of the 1968 
Transport Act in respect of large projects). Compensating 
arrangements were made to provide block grant support for all 
current expenditure on local transport. 
This reform of the TSG system can be seen as consistent with the 
Government's evolving priorities for local transport expenditure. 
The two principal themes were, firstly, the need to If.. . contain 
revenue support to public transport ...I8 and , in particular, an 
unwillingness to support generalised low fares policies and , 
secondly, the need to promote roads capital expenditure, 
particularly on by-pass schemes to cater for heavy lorry traffic 
and provide relief to towns and villages.5' The reform can also 
be seen as enhancing the degree of central government influence 
over local transport priorities in relation to roads capital 
expenditure, particularly in London and the metropolitan areas. 
However, the reform of the TSG system should be seen as a 
component of a broader programme, also comprising the 1983 and 
1985 Transport Acts and the 1985 Local Government Act which had 
significant implications for the level and composition of 
transport expenditure in the major conurbations. 
The Government's rationale for the reform of the TSG system 
emphasisedthe role of local authorities' discretion overthe use 
of TSG in generating the problem of imbalance between local 
expenditure and central plans. However, it is clear that the 
effect of local discretion must be assessed within the context 
of the broader framework of central government controls on local 
authorities' expenditure. Therefore, the Government's rationale 
can be criticised for neglecting the role of those broader 
expenditure control systems. 
Indeed, the role of TSG in local transport expenditure declined 
between 1979/80 and 1984/85 due to a reduction in the total 
amount of grant of 21% in real terms, with its proportion of 
total relevant expenditure declining from 28% to 18%. Therefore, 
over this period there was an increase in the relative importance 
of factors relating to the operation of the broader systems for 
controlling current and capital expenditure. In particular, the 
reduction in the role of TSG was particularly marked from 1982/83 
to 1984/85 when constraints on expenditure due to the operation 
of the system of targets and penalties became increasingly 
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severe. 
Our analysis indicates that these broader expenditure control 
systems played an important role in generating the problem of 
underspending by local authorities on roads capital expenditure 
during the early 1980s. However, perhaps the first point to make 
is that the 'problem1 was not a serious one. Thus, taking roads 
and car parks together, the only significant underspend was in 
1981/82, the first year of the new capital control system when, 
as the Government acknowledged, authorities were adjustingtothe 
new system. 52 Looking at roads alone, the degree of 
underspending in 1983/84 and 1984/85 (7% and 6% respectively) 
cannot be seen as constituting a major problem given the size of 
the total programme. 
Moreover, in accounting for this degree of underspending, two 
aspects of the broader expenditure control systems are relevant. 
First, restraints on current expenditure imposed through targets 
and penalties impacted upon capital expenditure via debt charges 
to revenue accounts. We found evidence of this effect on 
authorities1 roads capital expenditure particularly amongst shire 
counties, many of whose targets in 1983/84 and 1984/85 were set 
below GRE. Second, under the new capital expenditure control 
system introduced in 1981/82 the Government set capital 
allocations somewhat below the level of provision to allow for 
the use by authorities of capital receipts accumulated from sales 
of land, buildings etc. However, the aggregate assumptions made 
by the Government did not reflect the relatively disadvantaged 
position of non-housing authorities. Since the authorities with 
themajor transport responsibilities were non-housing authorities 
there was something of an inherent tendency in this system 
towards underspending against the provision fortransport capital 
expenditure. 
Nevertheless, part of the problem must be attributed to the 
exercise by local authorities of discretion in determining 
expenditure priorities within the framework of the broader 
expenditure control systems. Thus, while authorities were 
underspending relative to provision for roads capital 
expenditure, there was significant overspending on, for example, 
education and social services. Therefore, within the constraints 
set by central government, local authorities could have given 
higher priority for available resources to roads at the expense 
of other services. However, the failure of local priorities to 
match central government assumptions is to some degree inherent 
in a system which embodies the principle of local autonomy and 
discretion in various respects. That the Government saw a 
Iproblem1 in the discrepancy between local priorities and central 
plans indicates an unwillingness to see that discrepancy as the 
price which must be paid for a political system in which local 
discretion is meaningful. It also indicates the inadequacy of 
the expenditure control systems in terms of providing the 
Government with the degree of control over local authorities 
necessary to ensure the conformance of local expenditure 
priorities with central plans and policies. 
The Government's reform of the TSG system can be understood in 
this context as a move to reduce the 'degrees of freedom' open 
to local authorities to develop expenditure priorities in 
conflict with central plans. The Government's stated rationale 
can be criticised on the grounds of the declining influence of 
TSG relative to the broader expenditure control systems and, 
therefore, of its limited role in generating the problem as 
perceived by the Government. This 'problem' would have existed 
even in the absence of TSG, arising from the political priorities 
of the GLC and metropolitan counties, in favour of expenditure 
on public transport and, in general terms, the interaction 
between factors relating, on the one hand, to the exercise of 
local discretion and, on the other hand, to the operation of the 
systems whereby central government sought to control local 
authorities' spending. 
2.5 Government Control of Local Trans~ort Ex~enditure 
During the period since the reform of the TSG system transport 
expenditure by local authorities has fallen much more into line 
with the Government's plans and priorities. This is primarily 
due to a substantial reduction in expenditure on public transport 
by local authorities since 1984/85. Thus, whereas spending on 
public transport revenue support and capital investment 
constituted 31% of total local authority transport expenditure 
in 1984/85, the equivalent proportion in 1987/88 budgets was only 
15%. An overspend in 1984/85 of some 80% relative to the 
Government's plans had been transformed into a budgeted 
underspend in 1987/88 of about 19%. 
In explaining this trend we have to consider the impact of the 
whole range of measures reviewed above: the impact of PELS; of 
abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties; of deregulation 
of local bus services; of targets and block grant penalties: of 
rate-capping; and, in the context of all these measures, of the 
reform of the TSG system. However, the effects of all these 
factors are interrelated and difficult to isolate; in this 
section we present a broad overview of trends since 1984/85. 
There are two main factors in the explanation of trends in local 
public transport expenditure. The first is the transfer of 
responsibility for most public transport in London from the GLC 
to central government through the establishment of London 
Regional Transport (LRT) as a nationalised industry under the 
1984 London Regional Transport Act. The Secretary of State 
assumed full control over the finances of LRT in 1985/86; for 
1984/85 the budget agreed by the GLC was used to fund LRT even 
though it was in excess of the Government's provision. This 
transfer resulted in a 41% reduction in real terms in current 
expenditure on public transport under local authority control 
(73% for capital expenditure) (Figure la). Under direct 
government control revenue support for LRT has been more than 
halved in real terms since 1985/86 while capital investment has 
been increased significantly in line with the Government's 
objectives of increasing the attractiveness and efficiency ofthe 
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system and thereby promoting increased revenue and higher 
productivity (ie imp:?ving the prospects for the system to 
operate commercially). There is some irony in this increase in 
capital expenditure in view of the fact that the level of 
expenditure approved by the GLC in 1984/85 represented an 
overspend relative to the Government's plans of some 11%. 
Since 1985/86, then, expenditure on public transport under local 
authority control has been dominated by the provincial 
metropolitan areas. The second main factor in the analysis, 
therefore, is the abolition of the metropolitan counties, with 
the GLC, in March 1986. As indicated earlier, responsibility for 
public transport in the provincial metropolitan areas passed to 
the 'joint board1 PTAs which were subject to strict expenditure 
limits and precept control by the Secretary of State, and which 
received direct capital allocations to cover public transport 
investment. As a result the degree of central government control 
over local public transport expenditure was increased further; 
in 1986/87 the Secretary of State controlled over 80% of current 
expenditure and most capital expenditure. In the metropolitan 
areas budgeted revenue support expenditure by the PTAs in 1987/88 
was down by 37.5% in real terms from the 1985/86 outturn of the 
metropolitan counties, and was only some 12% in excess of the 
Government's provision (GRE) compared with over 70% in 1985/86 
(Figure lc) 
The above two measures represent a political change of 
considerable significance: the abolition, in the country's major 
conurbations, of direct control over public transport by elected 
local councils. Outside the conurbations there were no such 
fundamental changes but, then, the shire counties collectively 
had consistently underspentthe Government's provision for public 
transport revenue support since 1979/80 (Figure ld). The 
principal measure of relevance to trends in these areas is the 
deregulation of local bus services in October 1986, following the 
1985 Transport Act, which requires all local authorities to 
submit to competitive tendering all services needing support to 
supplement those provided on a commercial basis. The main 
effects of this measure will be reflected in expenditure from 
1987/88 onwards but the Department of Transport has estimated 
that some 37% of the total reduction in expenditure on revenue 
support between 1985/86 and 1987/88 (budgets) is attributable to 
bus deregulation with the remainder due largely to the abolition 
of the metropolitan counties. 54 This would imply that the 
abolition of the metropolitan counties has reduced revenue 
support expenditure in the metropolitan areas by a quarter since 
1985/86, while deregulation is responsible for most of the 16% 
reduction in real terms in such expenditure since 1985/86 in the 
shire areas. 
However, the effects of deregulation in the shire areas must be 
considered in conjunction with the impact of the reform of the 
TSG system, which discontinued TSG support for expenditure on 
public transport and required such expenditure to 'compete' with 
the full range of other services in the framework of general 
expenditure controls. Of particular relevance here is the 
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replacement of the target and penalty system in 1986/87 with a 
modification to the block grant formula which results in an 
actual reduction in block grant entitlement as expenditure 
increases, and an accelerated rate of reduction for authorities 
exceeding a 'threshold' of about GRE + 10%. In addition, of 
course, authorities risk 'rate-capping' if their expenditure gets 
much above this 'thresholdn level. This broader system of 
expenditure restraint is likely to have contributed to the 
reduction in revenue support expenditure in the shire counties, 
given the range of pressing demands from other services such as 
education, social work, police and fire. Thus, the GRE for 
revenue support was reduced by 14.4% for the shire counties in 
1987/88 reflecting the savings from deregulation expected by the 
Government. Nevertheless, these authorities budgeted some 19% 
below GRE suggesting that revenue support expenditure tends to 
'lose out' somewhat in the competition for resources which are 
heavily constrained by the Government's broader expenditure 
controls (Figure id). 
With expenditure on local public transport services under greater 
control and substantially in line with its plans, the 
Government's attention has focused increasingly on expenditure 
on local roads. In recent years, statements of the Government's 
transport objectives have placed greater emphasis upon the 
development of the country's system of national and local roads 
with a particular stress on benefits to industry and business 
traffic and the promotion of economic We discussed in 
the previous section how the reform of the TSG system can be 
seen as reflecting this broader policy shift being designed to 
encourage local authorities to construct and improve roads 'of 
more than local importance' which complement the system of 
national roads, and which authorities might not otherwise give 
high priority. We also indicated that this reform was 
implemented in a context of underspending by local authorities 
on roads capital investment relative to the Government's plans. 
In an analysis of recent trends in expenditure on local roads, 
both capital expenditure on construction and improvement, and 
current expenditure on maintenance, the implications of the 
reform of the TSG system are of central importance. However, 
such implications must be examined in the context of other 
important changes. First, as in our previous discussion of 
public transport expenditure, the effect of the abolition of the 
GLC and metropolitan counties must be considered. In this case, 
however, the relevant functions were devolved to the 
borough/district councils and, as a result, priorities for 
expenditure on road construction, improvement and maintenance 
have to be decided in the context of a wider range of services 
including education, housing, social services and community and 
leisure services. 
Other important changes have been made to the general systems for 
controlling local authoritiesn current and capital expenditure. 
As regards current expenditure, as we have seen, the target and 
penalty system was replaced in 1986/87 by a grant penalty system 
which was built into the block grant formula and which resulted 
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in a loss of block grant as expenditure increased. The main 
change affecting capital expenditure was the reduction of capital 
allocations in 1987/88 to allow for the use by authorities of 
their accumulated capital receipts as well as in-year receipts. 
The requirement for the Government to use aggregate assumptions 
in adjusting capital allocations placed those authorities with 
below average receipts at a disadvantage in terms of cover for 
capital expenditure. 
Therefore, since the reform of the TSG system road maintenance 
has essentially had to compete 'on equal terms' for scarce 
resources with a wide range of local authority services all of 
which face pressing demands for additional spending in a context 
of expenditure restraint. In particular, with the abolition of 
the GLC and metropolitan counties maintenance expenditure in the 
conurbations became subject to much greater competition from 
other services. In contrast to the picture for public transport 
revenue support, the Government has increased provision for 
spending on road maintenance significantly since 1985/86 
reflecting "...the high priority the Government gives to 
maintaining the local road networkn1 56 and If. . . the Government' s 
continuing commitment to ensuring that roads are kept in a 
satisfactory condition."57 However, although local authorities 
have increased their spending on road maintenance, the increase 
has not been sufficient to match the Government's plans resulting 
in a significant underspend - some 12% on 1987/88 budget data 
(see Figure 2). 
A similar mismatch between local authority expenditure and the 
Government's spending plans exists in the case of roads capital 
expenditure - an underspend of some 24% on 1987/88 estimates. 
Since the reform of the TSG system part of this expenditure - 
that relating to roads 'of more than local importance' - has been 
eligible for TSG at the rate of 50% while that relating to purely 
local works must be financed wholly by normal sources of capital 
finance (eg borrowing, receipts etc) . In fact, local 
authorities' expenditure did increase in 1985/86 and 1986/87 thus 
eliminating the previously persistent underspend. Therefore, in 
1986/87 roads capital expenditure was in excess of the 
Government's plans for the first time since the introduction of 
the new capital control system in 1981/82 (Figure 3). This could 
be seen as evidence of some degree of success for the new TSG 
system in promoting investment in larger road schemes 'of more 
than local importance', evidence which is supported by DTp data 
on road scheme starts since 1 9 8 4 / ~ 5 . ~ ~  However, the significant 
underspend arose in 1987/88 as authorities' expenditure declined 
in spite of an increase (17% in real terms) in the Government's 
provision. 
In the case of both road maintenance and road construction 
expenditure the Government has argued that the underspending 
problem has arisen because local authorities are not according 
such expenditure sufficiently high priority. 59 On the other 
hand, local authorities would tend to emphasise the impact of the 
Government's restraints on their expenditure and the role of 
features ofthe expenditure control systems. We will present the 
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findings of a more detailed analysis of this issue below but at 
this stage we can provide a general outline. 
In broad terms, it is evident that the problem of underspending 
by local authorities on roads expenditure relative to the 
Government's plans can be explained in terms of two sets of 
factors. On the one hand, local authorities1 expenditure 
decisions clearly are influenced heavily by the framework of 
expenditure controls implemented by the Government to restrain 
the level of local government expenditure and to influence this 
distribution. There are features of these control systems which 
can be seen as contributing towards the problem. As regards 
current expenditure on road maintenance, the increase in 
expenditure provision in the Governmentls plans between 1985/86 
and 1987/88 (20% in real terms) was not matched by an equivalent 
increase in the resources permitted to local authorities by 
central government. Thus, the contribution of block grant to 
local authority relevant expenditure decreased from 35% in 
1985/86 to 32% in 1987/88. The road maintenance GRE (central to 
the distribution of block grant) was increased by only 14.5% in 
real terms over this period. In 1986/87 the system of negative 
marginal rates of block grant was introduced so that as 
authorities1 expenditure increased, their block grant decreased. 
From 1985/86 the prospect of rate-capping faced authorities with 
total expenditure significantly in excess of GRE. Therefore, the 
Government's framework of expenditure control provided a climate 
of restraint. 
As regards roads capital expenditure the most significant feature 
of the system of capital expenditure control was the approach, 
introduced by the Government in 1987/88, to accommodating the 
spending power derived by authorities from accumulated capital 
receipts. Since the Government has to make aggregate assumptions 
in setting capital allocations authorities with below average 
receipts find themselves disadvantaged in terms of actual 
spending power. Since housing represents the main source of 
receipts while relatively few derive from transport, many shire 
counties in particular are disadvantaged by this approach and 
therefore face difficulties in supplementingtheir roads capital 
allocations sufficiently to make expenditure consistent with the 
Government's provision. 
Nevertheless, in order to explain the problem fully it is 
necessary to refer to a second set of factors relating to the 
behaviour of local authorities within the parameters set by the 
Government's expenditure control systems; specifically, their 
approach to setting expenditure priorities between competing 
demands from the full range of their services. Notwithstanding 
the influence of central government controls and restraints local 
authorities do have considerable discretion in setting 
expenditure priorities. As regards road maintenance, it is clear 
that, in the absence of TSG support, authorities are not 
according it the degree of priority desired by the Government 
relative to, for example, education and social services, 
expenditure on which tends to be in excess of GRE. Given the 
discretion which authorities have in the use of capital 
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allocation and receipts it would appear, again, that authorities 
are not assigning the priority to roads programmes that the 
Government would like to see. However, it would appear that TSG 
support is helping to sustain expenditure on roads 'of more than 
local importance'; it is expenditure on purely local facilities 
which, in the absence of TSG support, is tending to suffer. 
Therefore, the analysis of the issue of central government 
control over local authorities' expenditure must focus on factors 
relating, on the one hand, to the framework for central control 
over local government expenditure and, on the other hand, to the 
behaviour of local authorities in terms of exercising their 
discretion within that framework to determine expenditure 
priorities. It is the interaction between these two sets of 
factorswhichmust be analyzed in explaining particular outcomes. 
We now proceed to our analysis of local roads expenditure. The 
next section covers capital on road construction and improvement 
while in section 4 we deal with road maintenance. 
3. Roads Cavital Exvenditure and Transvort Supvlementarv  ant 
Since 1985/86 
3.1 Introduction 
We have seen that the degree of discrepancy between local 
authorities1 expenditure on roads and the Governmentls spending 
plans has recently become larger than at any time during the past 
eight years since the introduction of the present expenditure 
control systems. As regards capital expenditure on local road 
construction and improvement 1987/88 estimates indicate a 24% 
underspend relative to the Government's plans. This significant 
underspend has developed in the context of the reformed TSG 
system, which was designed specifically to promote roads capital 
expenditure by local authorities in order to overcome persistent 
underspending in the early and mid 1980s. This suggests problems 
with the effectiveness of the system from the Government's point 
of view. However, it is important also to look at the problem 
from the local authorities' point of view and assess the extent 
to which the system is permitting them to address effectively 
their local transport problems and needs. 
In this section we first discuss briefly the Government's 
objections and policies for roads and the mechanisms for 
financing total roads expenditure; this is followed by a summary 
of our analysis of the operation of the TSG system in the context 
of the broader capital expenditure control system since 1985/86 
and the implications for local authorities' ability to meet local 
needs. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of some issues 
arising from the analysis. 
3.2 Government Policv and the Financins of Local Roads 
Recent statements of the Government's policies for roads stress 
a commitment to sustaining a high level of investment in roads. 60 
The general policy objectives relating to this commitment are: 
a) to provide, or promote the provision of, a road network 
which yields an adequate return on investment and 
maintenance costs in terms of benefits to industry and 
other road users, with full regard to safety and 
environmental considerations; 
b) to promote the effective use of the road system in ways 
which procure a reasonable balance between the 
conflicting 6,needs for movement, safety and the 
environment. 
The Government's objectives for national roads stress, firstly, 
the promotion of economic growth through reducedtransport costs; 
secondly, the improvement of the environment by the removal of 
through traffic (especially lorries) from unsuitable roads in 
towns and villages; and, thirdly, the enhancement of road 
0. . - 
safety .62 As regards local roads, the objective is I' . . . to meet 
growing business and other traffic and so reduce costly delays 
and accidents; and ... to provide safe and convenient facilities 
for cyclists and pedestrians, and to improve the en~ironment."~~ 
It is clear that the Government places considerable emphasis upon 
'I... the importance attached to roads in aiding economic growth 
and increasing the competitiveness of industry through reduced 
transport In supporting local authorities' roads 
capital expenditure the Government gives priority to those roads 
which are defined as being 'of more than local importance' 
because they carry significant amounts of longer distance through 
traffic and therefore complement the national network. Since the 
importance of such roads extends beyond individual authorities 
the Government has concentrated TSG since 1985/86 to support 
capital expenditure on them. 65 
The purpose of TSG is ". .. to encourage local authorities to 
build or improve through routes that might not otherwise have 
high priority, in terms of purely local considerations.'~~~ 
Support for such schemes can, therefore, by related to the 
Government's priorities firstly, to assist economic growth by 
reducing transport costs and, secondly, to improve the 
environment by removing through traffic from towns and villages. 
TSG is provided to local authorities on the basis of annual bids 
submitted in their Transport Policies and Programme (TPP) 
documents which outline highways and traffi~~~managernent capital 
programmes to meet the needs of their areas. These programmes 
contain proposals for schemes which are considered to be 'of more 
than local importance' (ie eligible for TSG) also proposals for 
expenditure on items not eligible for TSG (eg works of mainly 
local importance, vehicles plant, machinery and depots for road 
works). 
The Secretary of State for Transport decides the amount of each 
authority's bid to accept for TSG support and grant is paid at 
a rate of 50% of this 'accepted expenditure'. TSG is paid 
ostensibly as a block grant in respect of the accepted programme 
as a whole but all 'major' schemes (with a total cost of £1 
million or more) are 'named1 and monitored by the DTp to ensure 
that actual expenditure on them is in line with estimates. 
'Minor' schemes (costing less than £1 million) are not named and 
are accepted for support in an undifferentiated minor works 
block. 
The Secretary of State also specifies capital allocations to 
cover expenditure by each authority on roads, such allocations 
providing 'spending power' and borrowing approval to finance 
capital expenditure. Each authority's allocation is sufficient 
to cover TSG accepted expenditure plus an amount to take account 
of other (TSG-ineligible) expenditure. This amount is also 
decided by the Secretary of State on the basis of the TPP 
submission. 
However, since 1987/88 capital allocations have been set lower 
than the Government's planned total expenditure on local roads 
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because of the spending power zcruing to local authorities from 
accumulated capital receipts. Current legislation does not 
permit account to be taken of variation between individual 
authorities in terms of the actual receipts available and 
authorities' allocations are set on the basis of aggregate 
assumptions about the availability of receipts to supplement 
borrowing. Therefore, authorities with low levels of actual 
receipts can find themselves with inadequate spending power to 
cover their roads capital programmes. 
Such programmes can be broken down into various components in 
terms of the source of spending power. The first component is 
the programme of expenditure accepted for TSG support. This 
expenditure is covered fully by an authority's roads capital 
allocation and supported by TSG at the rate of 50%. Normally, 
the main element will be expenditure on 'named1 major works which 
is monitored closely by the DTp and therefore, in effect, 
represents a 'first call1 on capital resources. The minor works 
element of accepted expenditure is not subject to the same 
detailed scrutiny. 
The second main component of roads capital programmes is 
expenditure which is not eligible for TSG support. This 
expenditure can be covered by the capital allocation remaining 
after TSG-eligible expenditure has been accommodated. However, 
if an authority's roads capital allocation is inadequate to 
provide full cover then additional spending power is required. 
The two possible source of such spending power are, firstly, the 
virement of capital allocation from other service blocks and, 
secondly, the use of capital receipts up to levels prescribed 
by the Government. The potential for allocating such spending 
power to roads programmes will vary between authorities both 
because of differential availability of capital receipts and 
because the scope for the application of the available receipts 
and the virement of other services1 capital allocation to roads 
expenditure will depend on local political priorities. 
In view of the fact that TSG-eligible expenditure will normally 
have 'first call1 on authorities capital allocations, it is 
evident that the Government's approach to setting allocations 
since 1987/88, which allows for assumed availability of 
accumulated capital receipts, renders the non-TSG element of 
capital programmes vulnerable in authorities whose actual 
receipts do not match the assumptions. Clearly, this has 
potential implications for the ability of authorities to address 
local transport needs because this non-TSG element includes 
schemes which are directed specifically at such local needs and 
problems. This includes smaller road improvement schemes and 
traffic management measures, accident remedial measures, 
facilities for cyclists and pedestrians and for parking and 
public transport. Moreover, the availability of resources for 
such schemes is of some considerable importance to the ability 
of authorities to develop co-ordinated strategies for the 
effective management of traffic throughout their areas. 
3.3 Resource Provision and Local Needs 
The analysis of resource provision for local road construction 
and improvement is subject to the problem of limited timescale 
since the reform of the TSG system in 1985/86. In that year 
there were clearly many uncertainties about the new system and 
the following year brought the disruptions due to the abolition 
of the GLC and metropolitan counties. This measure resulted in 
a net transfer of resources to the successor authorities as 
illustrated in Figure 4.69 This was also reflected by a regional 
shift in the balance of resources in favour of the North as shown 
in Table 1. 
Since 1986/87 there has been a relative shift in resources back 
to the South of the country, primarily to the Outer London area 
where several major road schemes have made heavy demands on TSG 
resources. This has been at the expense of other authorities 
whose share of resources has declined. The Inner London boroughs 
have suffered reductions in both TSG and capital allocations. 
The shire counties have experienced a significant real reduction 
in capital allocation, although TSG has increased, while 
resources for the metropolitan districts have remained roughly 
constant in real terms since 1986/87 (Figure 4). 
Table 1 Distribution of Transvort SuvplementarvGrantandRoads 
Ca~ital Allocation - Reqions - 1985/86 to 1988/89 
Figures Transport Supplementary Roads Capital Allocation 
in Grant 
percent 
North 25.4 28.9 27.7 26.3 25.1 27.9 27.1 26.3 
Midlands 20.3 18.4 17.7 17.4 18.9 18.1 18.5 17.4 
South 54.0 52.6 54.7 56.2 56.0 53.9 54.5 56.3 
Notes: 
North = North, North West and Yorkshire and Humberside 
Midlands = East Midlands and West Midlands 
South = East Anglia, Greater London, South East and South West 
In order to assess the extent to which resources have matched 
authorities' needs at an aggregate level we have compared the 
distribution of resources between authorities with their TPP 
bids, which represent authorities' own assessments of their 
needs.70 Following substantial changes in 1986/87 in which the 
metropolitan districts and Inner London boroughs have experienced 
the greatest reductions in the proportions of their assessed 
needs met by TSG and, in particular, capital allocations. 
Indeed, there is evidence that the larger urban authorities 
amongst the metropolitan districts have suffered a greater-than- 
average reduction in both TSG and capital allocation relative to 
their bids suggesting that the 'inner conurbationr authorities 
will face particular difficulties in addressing their problems 
and needs through roads capital expenditure unless they can apply 
their capital receipts to such expenditure. The shire counties 
have 'held their own' in terms of TSG but their capital 
allocations have also met a declining proportion of their bids. 
On the other hand, the Outer London boroughs have benefitted most 
as both TSG and capital allocation have increased as a proportion 
of their assessed needs. 
The combination of increasing 'accepted expenditure' for TSG- 
eligible schemes and declining roads capital allocation has 
resulted (given that TSG-supported expenditure has 'first call' 
on capital allocation) in a reduction in the amount of capital 
allocation available to authoritiesto cover non-TSG expenditure. 
From Figure 4 it can be seen that all classes of authority have 
been affected by the change in the Government's approach to 
allowing for accumulated capital receipts in 1987/88. The 
effect on authorities' non-TSG roads programmes will depend 
firstly, upon their abilityto vire capital allocation from other 
service blocks and, secondly, upon their abilityto apply capital 
receipts to roads expenditure. 
Our analysis suggests that the shire counties have experienced 
particular difficulties because, in general, they are not able 
to generate capital receipts on a sufficient scale to compensate 
fully for the reduction in capital allocations. This is firstly 
because transport does not generate capital receipts on a 
substantial scale and, secondly, because the shire counties do 
not have responsibilities for housing, the major source of 
receipts. Thus, whereas transport constitutes 34% of capital 
payments by the shire counties, capital receipts make up only 
about 10% of their total capital spending power.71 The imbalance 
between classes of authority in terms of transport expenditure 
and capital receipts is shown graphically in Figure 5. Further, 
there is an imbalance between shire counties in terms of their 
Oability to generate receipts, particularly between those in the 
South (and especially the South East) which have benefitted from 
escalating land and property values, and those in the North of 
the country. 72 
This imbalance can be seen as intensifying the effect of the 
relative shift in TSG and capital allocation away from the North 
and in favour of the South since 1986/87, as discussed above. 
The implications for authorities' abilityto meet their needs for 
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roads capital expenditure are illustrated by, for example, 
Cheshire County Council which, amongst our sample of authorities, 
has indicated severe difficulties in financing its roads capital 
programme. 
However, there is another dimension to the problem which relates 
to the relative priority attached to roads expenditure by 
authorities when considering the use of prescribed capital 
receipts which are available and the virement of capital 
allocation between service blocks. Thus, overspending by local 
authorities in recent years on education, social services and 
environmental services (eg planning and economic development) 
indicates a relatively high priority for such services in 
authorities' resource planning. Indeed, a large proportion of 
the shire counties' capital receipts accrues from education and 
environmental services and authorities, in general, clearly do 
not find it feasible to transfer such receipts, or capital 
allocation cover, to roads expenditure. 
In the metropolitan districts and London boroughs this issue of 
relative priorities between services in the use of available 
resources is of even greater significance. These authorities do 
have access to capital receipts on a substantial scale by virtue 
of their responsibilities for housing and, indeed, a wide range 
of other services (Figure 5). Therefore, they are somewhat 
better placed than the shire counties to compensate for reduced 
capital allocations since 1986/87. The abolition of the GLC and 
metropolitan counties has improved the potential for the 
application of capital receipts to highways expenditure in these 
areas by devolving the highways function to authorities with a 
wider range of services. However, our analysis suggests that 
this potential is not being realised in practice and that the 
metropolitan district authorities are experiencing some 
difficulty in assigning high priority to highways expenditure 
relative to other services. There would appear to be three main 
reasons for this difficulty. First, a reluctance on the part of 
Housing Committees to surrender spending power from receipts 
because of the serious housing problems experienced by 
metropolitan authorities. Second, a problem in assigning high 
priority to roads expenditure by these authorities relative to 
their other 'traditionalt, long-established services (such as 
education, social services, housing, leisure and community 
services) which face heavy demands for increased expenditure due 
to the range of economic and social problems in these areas. 
Third, the magnification of these effects by the reductions in 
capital allocations for those other services. 
The situation in Sheffield perhaps typifies the metropolitan 
authorities: 
Although anxious to find and implement solutions to the 
various transportation needs within the city, the council 
regards problems related to housing and education, for 
example, as more pressing. As a result, it decided to adopt 
a highways capital programme ... which is marginally less 
than the highways capital allocation. "73 
The problem for all authorities is exacerbated by the restraints 
exercised by the Government on revenue expenditure through the 
block grant system which constrain the expansion of capital 
programmes via the impact on debtcharges. As discussed earlier, 
authorities have faced, since 1986/87, a negative marginal rate 
of block grant as their expenditure increases, with the rate of 
reduction rising sharply above a 'threshold' of about GRE + lo%, 
and with the additional threat of rate-capping for expenditure 
much above this level. For example, in 1987/88 if Cleveland 
County Council had spent their 'threshold' of GRE + 9.5% the 
grant penalty would have risen to £ 1.23 so each pound spent would 
have cost local ratepayers £2.23. 74 This forces authorities to 
consider very carefully the revenue consequences of capital 
programmes although our analysis suggests that this factor is, 
in general, subsidiary to the effect of the capital expenditure 
control system (and the response of authorities to the 
determination of expenditure priorities) in explaining recent 
trends in roads capital expenditure. 
We have attempted to assess the implications of these trends for 
authorities' approaches to addressing their local transport 
problems and needs with reference to our sample of local 
a~thorities.~' Our analysis suggests that, on the whole, local 
authorities are displaying a commitment to the TSG system with 
expenditure on TSG-eligible works more than matching 'accepted' 
level: 22% in excess in 1987/88 in our total sample (see Figure 
6). However, this excess arises primarily from expenditure on 
TSG-eligible minor works indicating a discrepancy between the 
perceptions of the Government and local authorities as to the 
need for such expenditure and, more particularly, as to the 
appropriate balance between the major and minor components of 
total expenditure accepted for TSG support. 
Whilst the Government might gain satisfaction from this picture 
as regards the operation of the TSG system, it is clear that 
local authorities are facing problems financing non-TSG elements 
in their roads capital programmes. For such expenditure, much 
depends on the ability of authorities to supplement their roads 
allocation. Indeed, most of the 'overspending' on TSG-eligible 
works is accounted for by authorities which are able to 
supplement their allocations. Even in such authorities we found 
that non-TSG works suffered and the situation was worse in 
authorities unable to apply capital receipts or vire allocation 
to roads expenditure. The result has been a severe restraint on 
the ability of authorities to direct resources at specifically 
local transport problems and needs through roads capital 
expenditure. From our analysis of selected local authorities we 
have obtained a general picture of the type of highways capital 
works which are experiencing the most serious restraint in the 
present circumstances and of the nature of problems and needs 
which are therefore not being addressed as effectively as they 
otherwise might: 
1. Major structure re-conditioning and improvement of roads 
funded from capital 
Authorities which have applied for TSG in respect of 
such works on roads of more than local importance have 
tended not to be successful. The funding of such works 
on all roads has therefore had to rely on the non-TSG 
proportion of capital allocation or capital receipts 
and has been subject to restraint where such sources 
are limited, resulting in a growing problem of failed 
roads and a requirement for higher revenue spending on 
maintenance. 
2. Schemes for the construction and improvement of local roads 
Many authorities have some relatively large schemes not 
eligible for TSG which must be accommodated in the non- 
TSG portion of capital allocation, supplemented where 
possible from other sources. There is evidence of 
authorities having to delay the implementation of 
highly cost-effective schemes directed at local 
traffic, environmental and safety problems, and 
designed to assist local economic development. 
3. Minor works programmes 
Such programmes comprise relatively low cost works 
directedprimarily at trafficmanagement, environmental 
and safety problems, usually providing very cost- 
effective solutions but subject to cuts when non-TSG 
resources are constrained. Particularlybadlyaffected 
within such programmes are facilities for cyclists, 
facilities and schemesto improve the effectiveness and 
attractiveness of public transport, bridge 
reconstruction and repair works, and the replacement 
and improvement of street lighting. 
4. Car parking facilities 
Since 1987/88 capital allocation for such facilities 
has been provided only in exceptional circumstances and 
this makes it more difficult for authorities to secure 
appropriate parking facilities since the presumption 
is that these should be funded from trading profits or 
capital receipts, or provided by the private sector. 
Many authorities are sceptical about the scope for 
providing the necessary facilities from receipts and 
about the prospects for private sector provision and 
see threats to commercial development of town centres 
and to their ability to formulate integrated and co- 
ordinated transport strategies dependent upon control 
over parking. 
Certain other areas of concern on the part of local authorities 
emerge from our analysis. First, there is some concern about the 
burden of advance works and acquisition costs in respect of TSG- 
eligible schemes not achieving 'early conditional acceptance' 
since such costs must be borne fully by the non-TSG element of 
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capital allocation or capital receipts, but are necessary in 
order to demonstrate commitment to a scheme and therefore enhance 
its prospects of eventual acceptance for TSG support. Second, 
there is also some concern about the impact on authorities8 
Direct Labour Organisations of restraints on smaller schemes and 
minor works programmes which are not providing sufficient work 
to maintain a constant workload in an environment of competitive 
tendering. 
A final area of concern relates to the availability of resources 
to finance road schemes which are important in the promotion of 
local economic development. One aspect of this concerns the 
availability of finance to ensure progress of road schemes 
attracting EEC support (from the European Regional Development 
Fund) so that grants are not jeopardised. Another aspect 
concerns authorities8 ability to implement schemes which provide 
access to areas with prospects for industrial and commercial 
development. Many authorities formulate their highways 
programmes in the context of broader strategies for local 
economic development/regenerationand restraints on resources for 
non-TSG works have produced concern about the prospects for 
schemes to assist economic development objectives. This has led 
certain authorities to take up the issue of partnership with the 
private sector where such schemes provide clear benefits to 
developers. 
3.4 Effectiveness and Distributional Issues 
Arising from our analysis we identify a number of issues upon 
which we can make certain observations. These issues relate to 
two basic concerns: first, the effectiveness of the Government's 
system for supporting and controlling capital expenditure on 
local roads; and, second, certain considerations relating to 
equity or distributional implications. 
As regards effectiveness, we can consider first the local 
authorities' viewpoint. On the whole, local authorities appear 
to be displaying a commitment to the reformed TSG system with 
bids exceeding the available resources to a significant degree 
and expenditure on TSG-eligible schemes exceeding the level 
accepted by the DTp for grant support. It would seem, therefore, 
that local authorities are obtaining sufficient benefits for 
local road users and communities from TSG-supported schemes to 
make locally-borne costs worthwhile from their perspective. 
However, there are specific complaints relating, for example, to 
the timescale of eligibility of costs for grant support and there 
is evidence that, from the local authorities8 point of view, 
inadequate support is given to minor works. Moreover, the lack 
of grant support for capital expenditure on structural re- 
conditioning and improvement of roads can be seen as an issue 
requiring consideration by the Government. 
Clearly, many local authorities are having severe problems with 
the operation of the broader capital expenditure control system 
and, in particular, with the treatment of capital receipts in the 
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distribution of capital allocation. Inequities in spending power 
arise at the level of individual authorities and we shall return 
to this below. There are also implications for effectiveness 
because authorities facing severe restraints are unable to 
implement relatively high priority local schemes whereas those 
with above average capital receipts will be able to include 
schemes lower down their priority lists. The Government's 
system for capital expenditure control should provide all 
authorities with the spending power which enables them actually 
to meet those needs in their TPP submissions which are sanctioned 
by the DTp. The present approach does not achieve this but the 
Government has plans to reform the system of local authority 
capital finance from April 1990 so as to come closer to this aim. 
We will return to this issue in section 5 below. 
We have seen that it is programmes for non-TSG works which have 
suffered most in those authorities unable to supplement their 
roads capital allocations substantially from capital receipts. 
Such works are directed at specifically local problems and needs 
and are traditionally of particular concern to local elected 
members. We have no evidence to suggest that the restraints on 
such works due to the operation of the combined TSG and broader 
capital expenditure control system are creating sufficient 
frustration to provide the basis for a 'backlash' against TSG 
schemes. However, this could always be a danger so long as some 
authorities continue to feel unfairly treated by the system. 
The restraint on non-TSG expenditure raises two specific concerns 
in terms of effectiveness. First, there is evidence that cuts 
in expenditure are bearing heavily on less 'visible' elements 
in authorities' highway programmes such as repairs to structures 
and replacement of street lighting. This can result in higher 
future capital costs and higher revenue spending meantime. 
Second, as we have argued previously, restraints on minor works 
programmes combined with the exclusion of cover for car parking 
from capital allocations reduce the ability of authorities to 
1 develop strategies for the effective management of urban traffic. 
Turning to the Governmentls viewpoint on effectiveness, in 
relation to TSG support, the fact that authorities1 bids for TSG 
exceed the available resources to a significant degree provides 
the element of competition for grant which is seen by the 
Government as important in ensuring that the available resources 
are used effectively. However, this test of effectiveness is 
confined within the consideration of alternative road schemes 
which are eligible for TSG; it assumes a given level of resources 
for such schemes in total. It is also important to consider 
effectiveness in a wider sense, in relation to possible 
alternative uses for those resources - alternative types of road 
schemes, alternative transport investment, use for other non- 
transport purposes etc. In other words, it is important to 
consider opportunity costs. In the context of our study we can 
say little about this broader issue. What we can do is make some 
observations in relation to the question: How effective is TSG 
support in achieving the objectives and securing the benefits as 
designated by the Government for the TSG system? 
- 
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In this regard we can refer briefly to two main issues. The 
first issue concerns the extent to which the reformed TSG system 
is promoting the implementation of road schemes which would not 
otherwise have been realised. Many of the schemes put forward 
to date by local authorities for TSG support will have been in 
their forward programmes prior to the reform of the TSG system. 
It can be presumed, therefore, that, given adequate resources and 
sufficient priority fromthe local authority, such schemes would 
have been implemented even in the absence of the reform of the 
TSG system. Such implementation would have been on the basis of 
a purely local perspective on benefits for local road users and 
communities and many would have been commenced but for the 
restraints on local authorities' capital expenditure (exacerbated 
by revenue expenditure restraints via debt charges). 
Since the stated objective of the reformed TSG system is to 
promote the construction of roads of more than local importance 
that local authorities would not otherwise give high priority, 
doubts arise about the effectiveness and necessity of the 
decision to reform the system to the extent, firstly, that many 
of the schemes subsequently implemented were already planned 
prior to the reform and, secondly, that previous delays in 
implementation were attributable to broader restraints on capital 
expenditure. The other important consideration is the role of 
local authorities' own priorities. To the extent that such 
priorities played a role in implementation delays prior to reform 
of the system, and that the reformed system has encouraged 
authorities to give higher priority to major road schemes, the 
effectiveness of the decision to reform the system is enhanced. 
Support for this effect is provided by recent progress with some 
large schemes in London although the abolition of the GLC is also 
an important variable. Therefore, we would pass a rather 'mixed' 
verdict on the operation of the reformed TSG system to date. 
However, it is not really possible to consider the effectiveness 
of the TSG system in isolation from the broader system for the 
control of local authorities' capital expenditure. Due to 
restraints deriving from the latter, progress with the 
implementation of major road schemes 'of more than local 
importance' has been achieved at the expense of smaller schemes 
with substantial local benefits. This raises questions about 
effectiveness defined from this broader perspective. In 
particular, the achievement of objectives embodying non-local 
benefits is being promoted at the expense of the achievement of 
objectives which relate more to purely local traffic, 
environmental and safety objectives. The implications for 
effectiveness depend upon the relative priority assignedto these 
two sets of objectives and herein lies the source of divergence 
between governmental and local authority views. The Government's 
main interest is in promoting the improvement of the national 
network of major roads to obtain 'strategic' benefits whereas the 
local authorities' main interest is in improving facilities to 
obtain local benefits. This brings us into the realm of 
distributional issues to which we will return below. 
The second main issue in our discussion of effectiveness concerns 
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the Government's emphasis, in their objectives and policies'for 
roads, upon the role of roads investment in assisting economic 
growth and, in particular, in reducing burdens on industry 
through lower transport costs. Effectiveness in the use of 
resources therefore depends to a significant degree upon the 
extent to which road schemes actually produce benefits related 
to these objectives. This is a complex issue, the full 
consideration of which is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
However, from research studies published to date there would not 
appear to be much support for arguments for effectiveness in this 
respect. 76 Nevertheless, such research does not provide an 
adequate basis for firm conclusions and there is certainly a case 
for more work in this area. 
Therefore, attention needs to be given to two questions. First, 
what are the relative potential benefits to industry and the 
economy from major schemes eligible for TSG support on the one 
hand, and from the type of local scheme which does not attract 
TSG support on the other? Second, given the Government's 
objectives for road investment, does the system for supporting 
and controlling local authorities1 roads capital expenditure 
promote the right balance of resource allocation between these 
types of schemes? Our analysis suggests that there are grounds 
for arguing that the present circumstances faced by local 
authorities do not result in adequate resources to tackle the 
local dimension of this problem. A further important question, 
beyond the scope of our analysis, concerns the balance between 
investment in national (motorways and trunk roads) and local 
roads in terms of effectiveness in achieving overall roads 
objectives. 
A particular aspect of this issue arises from consideration of 
the balance of resources between TSG and non-TSG schemes. This 
concerns the relative benefits to industry, and to the promotion 
of economic growth, of investment in major roads forming part 
of the PRN, as against investment in local roads providing access 
to the sites which actually generate and attract commercial and 
industrial traffic. Research conducted in inner urban areas of 
London and Leeds has highlighted the importance to firms of local 
traffic problems, and the implication of this work is that any 
benefits to industry from improvements to the major road network 
might be jeopardised if problems exist with local access to sites 
of industrial and commercial activity." This is likely to be 
We indicated above that the assessment of effectiveness 
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particularly relevant for industry in inner city areas. Whilst 
many TSG-supported schemes are designed to improve access from 
the motorway and trunk road network to major sites of industrial 
and commercial activity, there is nevertheless an important role 
to be played by non-TSG highway schemes in improving local access 
for business traffic, especially in large urban areas. However, 
restraints on resources for non-TSG programmes, particularly in 
those authorities with below-average capital receipts, 
potentially undermine this role although additional resources are 
available under the 1982 Industrial Development Act for I 
authorities in 'Assisted Areas1. 
I 
necessarily raises distributional issues because of the need to 
determine relative valuations and weightings of different types 
of benefits which accrue from roads investment. Because of 
differences in interests and values embodied in the perspectives 
of central and local government, which produce differences in 
priorities, we cannot expect to achieve a consensus on 
effectiveness from these two perspectives. Thus, the 
distribution of benefits from schemes which fulfil the criteria 
for TSG support will be significantly different from that 
characterising local non-TSG schemes and the 50% grant support 
fromthe Government relates specifically tothe benefits accruing 
to lnon-locall users and communities. If priority is to be given 
to the needs of business and commercial traffic, longer-distance 
private car commuters and to communities experiencing the 
intrusion of through traffic, then it is likely that 
effectiveness in resource use will be enhanced by promoting TSG 
schemes. There remains then a question as to whether or not a 
50% grant from the Government ensures an equitable balance 
between the burden on local ratepayers and the level of benefits 
accruing to local road users and communities. If, on the other 
hand, a perspective is adopted which gives priority to solving 
local traffic and environmental problems and to the needs of 
local public transport users, cyclists and pedestrians, then it 
is likely that effectiveness in resource use would be enhanced 
by achieving a transfer of resources from TSG to non-TSG schemes. 
This would be reinforced to the extent that it was felt that a 
50% central government grant for TSG schemes did not 'compensate' 
local ratepayers adequately for non-local benefits. 
A further distributional issue raised by our analysis relates to 
regional trends in resource allocation for roads investment. 
Recent trends indicating a shift in resources towards the south 
of the country may be a temporary phenomenon due to the peaking 
of expenditure on the large Outer London schemes. On the other 
hand, they may reflect an inherent tendency for resources to be 
attracted to areas experiencing growth in economic activity and 
traffic levels since the case for investment is demonstrated more 
soundly within a cost-benefit framework in such a context. With 
an increasing emphasis on demonstrable economic and environmental 
benefits, areas of lower growth could face a more difficult task 
in making the case for resources. Much depends on the extent to 
which roads investment can be justified as a basis for generating 
future growth in economic activity and upon the evaluation of 
such justifications relative to those which demonstrate the role 
of roads investment in accommodating and assisting existing 
growth in economic activity. 
The implications ofthis issue for inequalities in economic well- 
being are difficult to assess. Much depends upon the question 
discussed earlier of the extent to which investment in roads is, 
in fact, an important factor in promoting and assisting economic 
growth and the ways in which this occurs. A better understanding 
of this relationship is clearly of importance to the 
consideration of the extent to which roads investment could and 
should be an element in any regional policy designed to combat 
any danger of a 'vicious circle' of decline in northern and 
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peripheral regions while controlling a 'virtuous circle' of 
growth in the southern 'heartland'. 
A final aspect of .this problem derives from the unequal 
distribution of spending power form capital receipts due to the 
ability of authorities in the south to capitalise on high land 
and property values. This inequality can be seen as reinforcing 
the regional imbalances in resource allocation discussed above. 
4. The Maintenance of Local Roads 
4.1 Introduction 
There is growing concern about the condition of local roads in 
this country. Indeed, expressions of concern about deteriorating 
roads have been emanating for several years from local 
authorities and their associations, from organisations 
representing road users and from members of Parliament. For 
example, in 1983 the House of Commons Transport Committee 
reported on an enquiry into the road maintenance issue and 
concluded that 
..there is real cause for concern about the present 
condition of the network of non-principal and unclassified 
roads, and ... necessary remedial work is being prevented 
by financial constraints . . . We believe that there is an 
urgent need for some increase in the funds available for 
local road maintenance. w78 
However, although there is some degree of consensus on the facts 
of deteriorating local road conditions, this is not matched by 
consensus on the causes, and, therefore, the solutions. The 
House of Commons Transport Com~ittee has focused on the level 
of central government funding. The Government, on the other 
hand, has placed the blame on local authorities for failing to 
accord road maintenance sufgciently high priority for the 
resources which are available. The British Road Federation has 
attributed the problem to the 'I... complex and unsatisfactory 
system of local qovernment financet' and to the state of central- 
local relations. 1 
Our aim is to examine the relative influence of these factors in 
the explanation of the apparent inability of local authorities 
to meet their road maintenance needs to 'satisfactory' standards 
and, on this basis, to draw conclusions on how the problem might 
be overcome. Our particular concern is to examine the impact of 
changes in the financing of local road maintenance, in the 
context of the broader systems for central government control 
over local authority expenditure and, in particular, the effect 
of the reform of the TSG system in 1985/86 which discontinued 
support from this source for road maintenance. 
We discuss first, and briefly, the nature and scale of the road 
maintenance problem, identifyingthe main factors responsible for 
deteriorating road conditions. We then analyze the record of 
local government in responding to the road maintenance problem 
in the context of changes in central government policies and 
controls attempting to identify the main reasons for the 
inability of local authorities to maintain their roads to 
satisfactory standards. Finally, we discuss an approach to 
addressing the problem and for achieving a reversal in the trend 
of deterioration in local authority roads. 
4.2 The Scale of the Road Maintenance Problem 
It is clear that local authorities face a problem of some 
considerable magnitude in achieving an improvement in the 
condition of their roads. A substantial backlog of maintenance 
work has built up over the past decade or so due to inadequate 
treatment in the face of continually increasing needs. Our 
analysis covers the period since the beginning of the present 
decade but it should be stressed that road conditions at the turn 
of the decade had already been affected by cuts in maintenance 
expenditure during the latter part of the 1970s introduced as 
part of the broader programme of cuts in local government 
spending. 
A number of factors are responsible for increasing the demands 
upon local authorities in terms of road maintenance work. The 
length of public local road requiring maintenance increases 
continually with urban development. Delays to new road 
construction due to restraints on capital expenditure increase 
the requirement to patch and repair existing roads. The amount 
of traffic using local roads is growing constantly but of 
particular significance is the growth in heavy goods vehicles 
which cause the greatest damage to roads, on average in 
proportion to the fourth power of their axle loadings. It has 
been estimated that by 1986 the burden on public funds due to the 
wear caused by heavy commercial vehicles to roads and bridges had 
reached some £600 million per annum. 82 
The work of the so-called statutory undertakers (eg Gas, 
Electricity, Water, Post Office, British Telecom) is an important 
factor, these organisations having statutory powers under the 
1950 Public Utilities Street Works Act (PUSWA) to excavate the 
highway and footways to install or gain access to their services. 
The number of excavations has been increasing and local 
authorities have voiced serious concern about the standard of 
reinstatements. Such concern led to a recent review of the 1950 I 
Act by the Horne Committee and the Government has acted on 
the Committee's recommendations by issuing a new Code of Practice 
for the work of the statutory undertakers. However, there is 
still some concern, particularly about the implications of 
privatisation of the former public utilities and the resulting 
pressures to reduce costs on excavation works. 
Severe winter weather also places an additional maintenance 
burden on local authorities through snow-clearing and gritting 
operations but more importantly through the damage to roads 
caused by frost penetration which seeks out weaknesses caused by 
inadequate surface treatment, heavy goods vehicles and utility 
excavations. During the past decade harsh winter weather has 
been experienced in 1978/79, 1981/82, 1984/85 and 1985/86, all 
of which imposed considerable frost damage on local roads and an 
additional financial burden on local authorities. 
The growing use of traffic management and regulation measures, 
particularly in urban areas has produced an increased requirement 
for maintenance of 'street furniture' associated with such 
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measures. Comprehensive traffic management strategies have 
concentrated wear on certain roads, often minor link roads not 
suited to the task. The situation has been aggravated by capital 
expenditure restraints which have delayed new construction and 
improvement schemes resulting in an increasing public concern 
about environmental and conservation standards, about public 
safety and crime, and about improved facilities for disabled 
people, has added to the demands placed upon local authorities 
in terms of road maintenance work. 
While the need for maintenance work has increased, the cost of 
undertaking such work has also escalated significantly. Of 
particular importance have been increases in the cost of factor 
inputs, particularly labour, materials and energy which together 
constitute the major component of total maintenance costs. 
Taking into account inflation in such input costs, as measured 
by the DTp's 'Maintenance and Lighting Price indexga5, local 
authorities would have had to achieve substantial increases in 
efficiency to attain expenditure levels consistent with the 
Government's spending plans. Given that important elements of 
materials and energy costs are beyond the control of local 
authorities pressure has been placed on labour costs resulting 
in labour force reductions. 
An additional important element in the response of local 
authorities to expenditure restraints has been a reduction in the 
quantity and quality of work output. Routine or cyclic 
maintenance (ie grass cutting, sweeping, gully emptying and 
traffic sign maintenance) has tended to be reduced to minimum 
levels consistent with safety requirements while planned 
programmes of structural maintenance have been sacrificed to 
'problem solving' approaches involving more localised patching 
and surface dressing. Local authorities have warned that such 
trends are resulting in the storing up of expensive problems for 
the future. 
Indeed, there is a considerable amount of evidencz from both 
National Road Maintenance Condition Survey (NRMCS) and local 
authorities' own surveys which indicates a deterioration in the 
condition of local roads since 1980, particularly on principal 
and unclassified roads in urban areas and unclassified roads in 
rural areas. Based upon this survey evidence it is clear that 
a substantial increase in maintenance work is required to arrest 
this deterioration let alone to achieve an increase in standards 
to what would be widely regarded as 'satisfactory' levels. Local 
authority estimates suggest that a significant increase in 
expenditure is needed, particularly on structural maintenance; 
the Audit Commission recently estimated that an increase of £200 
million per annum is required in structural maintenance 
expenditure simply to arrest deterioration and hold the network 
at its present ~tandard.'~ On a total estimated national 
expenditure on structural maintenance in 1987/88 of some £660 
million the required increase is 30%. However, this estimate 
does not allow for any increase in expenditure on cyclic 
maintenance (which many authorities would argue is necessary) nor 
for any improvement in the standard of the highway structure. 
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In fact there are powerful economic and safety arguments 'for 
sustaining good standards of maintenance for local roads. The 
main economic argument is that failure to maintain the structure 
of highways to adequate standards can result in substantially 
greater cost in the future when major reconstruction is required 
at an earlier date that would otherwise be the case. As regards 
safety considerations, reduced standards of structural and cyclic 
maintenance increase the risk of accidents, with cyclists and 
motorcyclists particularly vulnerable to carriageway defects. 
These arguments are supported by evidence of considerable public 
dissatisfaction with the present state of the country's roads, 
both in national polls and in local authorities' surveys. 
Therefore, it is clear that there is a problem of inadequate 
maintenance of local roads; local authorities have not been 
undertaking sufficient maintenance work to address growing needs 
and problems to acceptable standards. Of course there will 
always be dispute about what constitutes 'acceptable standards' 
and how this should be determined but, this aside, the problem 
can be seen in terms of three questions. First, is the 
Government allocating sufficient resources to local road 
maintenance and do central government expenditure controls allow 
local authorities to direct sufficient resources to road 
maintenance? Second, within the framework of central government 
controls, to what extent does inadequate maintenance expenditure 
arise from the exercise of discretion by local authorities in the 
determination of priorities for available resources between their 
various services? Third, to what extent are the resources 
actually allocated by local authorities to road maintenance used 
effectively and efficiently in meeting defined needs? Our 
analysis attempts to provide some answers to these questions. 
4.3 Local Authoritv Responses to the Road Maintenance Problem 
Our analysis of trends and patterns in local authorities' road 
maintenance policies, expenditure and outputs relative to the 
Government's expenditure plans and provisions focuses on the 
period since the introduction of the block grant system in 
1981/82 and pays particular attention to the impact of the reform 
of the TSG system 1985/86. This reform discontinued support from 
this source for road maintenance expenditure which was 
incorporated fully into the gener~l block grant system in the 
same way as most other services. However, we examine this 
change in the context of the broader system of central government 
controls on local authority spending and also analyze the impact 
of the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties in 1986. 
As regards the period before the reform of the TSG system, the 
Government's primary concern over the half-decade to 1984/85 was 
to reduce local authorities' expenditure so as to bring it into 
line with central spending plans: 
" Responsible pay settlements, increased efficiency and the 
avoidance of waste should enable local government to 
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maintain satisfactory levels of road maintenance ... without 
having to overspend the  provision.'^^^ 
In this context of restraint overspending had been virtually 
eliminated by 1984/85. However, as Figure 2 shows, this was due 
to a combination of two factors. On the one hand, local 
authorities' expenditure declined in real terms between 1981/82 
and 1984/85 by 4.6% under pressure from the Government's 
expenditure restraints. On the other hand, the Government's 
provision increased in real terms following the severe reductions 
in 1981/82. 
Nevertheless, there were two factors which undermined this 
'success' from the Government's perspective, in achieving broad 
equality between local authority spending and central plans. 
First, the condition of local roads continued to deteriorate 
during this period, as we saw in the previous section, with the 
harsh 1981/82 winter being a particularly important factor. 
Second, the Government's expenditure plans and provision failed 
tomatch local authorities' own assessments of expenditure needs. 
This is illustrated in Figure 7 by the significant discrepancy 
between authorities' TPP bids and the level of expenditure 
accepted by the Government for TSG support. It is clear that in 
the metropolitan and shire areas local authorities were not 
meeting their assessed local needs; in London expenditure was 
closer to the level of TPP bids but this was only achieved by 
significant 'overspending'. 
Therefore, it is clear that there was a significant problem in 
terms of local authorities' ability to meet local road 
maintenance needs and, as Figure 7d shows, this problem was 
greatest in the shire areas. From the local authorities' 
viewpoint, the Government's argument that satisfactory levels of 
road maintenance should be possible if resources implied by 
central plans were used efficiently, was seen as invalid and 
unrealistic. In analysing this issue we examine the impact of 
TSG settlements but within the context of the broader system of 
expenditure control, particularly the operation of the system of 
expenditure targets and grant penalties. 
The contribution of TSG to local authorities' transport 
expenditure declined over this period, particularly between 
1982/83 and 1984/85 when, as a proportion of total accepted 
expenditure (ie including capital items) it fell from 25% to 
18%.~' This implies a reduction in its importance to the 
explanation of expenditure trends relative to the broader 
expenditure control systems. TSG supported a larger proportion 
of transport expenditure in London and the metropolitan counties 
than in the shire areas and our analysis suggests that it may 
have played a part in the former areas in providing more 
protection to maintenance expenditure from broader expenditure 
restraints. Such a conclusion is supported by an analysis of the 
1983/84 TSG settlement, in particular, which reduced 
significantlythe grant tothe shire counties, exposing them more 
to the impact of block grant penalties. Thus, maintenance 
expenditure in shire authorities declined by 5% in 1983/84 at a 
- .  
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time when they faced increased need due to damage from the wiliter 
of 1981/82 and pressures from the Government to implement schemes 
to relieve communities fromthe effects of heavy lorries (Figure 
7d) . 
The role of TSG must be seen in the context of the operation of 
broader expenditure controls, particularly the system of 
expenditure targets and grant penalties introduced in 1981/82, 
which imposed increasingly severe restraints upon local 
authoritiest expenditure over the period to 1984/85. As we saw 
in section 2.2 above this system 'cut acrosst the logic of the 
basic block grant system so targets did not bear a simple 
relationship to GREs. Authorities with expenditure above GRE 
could receive a target above GRE and vice versa; therefore, some 
authorities spending in excess of GRE were not liable to 
penalties whereas some spending below GRE were penalised. In 
fact, targets for the GLC and metropolitan counties (MCCs) were 
set above their GREs for essentially pragmatic reasons; however, 
the need to constrain expenditure to central plans resulted in 
targets for the shire counties in aggregate which fell 
progressively below GRE. 
The more marked reduction in maintenance expenditure in the shire 
counties, and the greater shortfall from accepted expenditure, 
than in London and the Metropolitan areas (Figure 7) indicate 
that targets and the prospect of grant penalties had a 
significant impact, increasingly preventing authorities from 
spending in accordance with their assessed needs. However, we 
found significant variations between authorities in terms of the 
apparent degree of protection given to maintenance expenditure 
from the impact of expenditure restraints thus indicating the 
importance of the role of local discretion in explaining 
expenditure trends in the context of the impact of the 
Government's expenditure control systems. 
The situation facing local authorities would appear to have been 
exacerbated by a degree of contradiction, and lack of co- 
ordination, betweenvarious elements of central government policy 
and control. Thus, on the one hand, the DTp , through the TSG 
system, was signalling a real terms increase in maintenance 
expenditure between 1981/82 and 1984/85 while, on the other hand, 
the broader expenditure control system (particularly targets and 
penalties) served to decrease local authoritiest expenditure in 
accordance with more general Government objectives. This 
contradictory situation drew comment from the Associations of 
County and District Councils: 
It A bid for increased maintenance expenditure may receive 
acceptance and possibly additional grant, but in the face 
of DOE pressure for overall expenditure cuts, the local 
authority could face blockgrant penalties on any additional 
expenditure. lt9' 
More specifically, such contradictions were evident in 1983/84 
when the pattern of TSG allocations and targets can be seen as 
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inconsistent with the Government's transport policy priorities 
relating to the promotion of roads expenditure, neglecting in 
particular the needs of the shire countiesto address maintenance 
problems aggravated by the severe winter of 1981/82, and 
contradicting the Governmentls policies for promoting roads 
expenditure at the expense of current expenditure on public 
transport revenue support. 
In their response to this situation of expenditure restraint, 
local authorities initially concentrated expenditure cuts on 
routine maintenance activities in order to protect structural 
maintenance. However, the restraints began to affect structural 
maintenance work in the early 1980s with the result that 
resurfacing and reconstruction works were reduced and greater use 
was made of low cost approaches such as patching and surface 
dressing in spite of authorities' fears about the longer-term 
consequences. Maintenance on minor roads in particular suffered 
as authorities concentrated resources on more heavily trafficked 
roads. We found that some authorities (eg Cleveland County 
Council) did attempt to mount programmes to address the backlog 
of structural maintenance but were unable to allocate sufficient 
resources to such programmes in the prevailing climate of 
restraint. 
Underlying these responses by authorities in terms of policies, 
priorities and outputs, there were also developments seeking to 
promote the more effective and efficient use of available 
resources in meeting road maintenance needs. Authorities made 
increasing use of technical assessment systems (eg MARCH and 
CHART) to provide more objective measures of road conditions 
and, therefore, promote more effective resource allocation. 
Also, concern about declining standards led the local authority 
associations jointly to develop a 'Code of Good Practicet for I 
highway maintenance which many authorities have adopted.92 I 
The Government's reform of the TSG system, discontinuing support 
fromthis source for current expenditure on road maintenance from 
1985/86, was introduced in a context of declining maintenance 
expenditure by local authorities and deteriorating road 
conditions. Notwithstanding the concern about these trends 
expressed by local authorities, their associations, the British 
Road Federation and the House of Commons Transport Committee in 
the mid 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  the issue of road maintenance appears not to have 
figured prominently in the Government's deliberations relative 
to the issues of spending on public transport and road 
construction and improvement. In our explanation of the problem 
TSG plays a rather subordinate role to the broader expenditure 
control system, especially targets and penalties but, 
nevertheless, there were grounds for reservations about the 
impact of the loss of TSG on local authorities1 road maintenance 
expenditure. 
Thus, on the one hand our analysis has suggested that, because 
it played a significant role in supporting transport expenditure 
by the GLC and MCCs, TSG may have served to protect maintenance 
expenditure somewhat from the impact of broader expenditure 
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restraints on these authorities, notwithstandingtheirprioriii ies 
in respect of public transport expenditure. On the other hand, 
we have seen that the shire counties (responsible for some 61% 
of local road maintenance expenditure in 1984/85) had experienced 
the most severe decline in maintenance expenditure because the 
relatively small contribution of TSG left such expenditure more 
exposed to the restraints exercised through the block grant 
penalty system. In the absence of TSG support, road maintenance 
expenditure would become more clearly dependent upon the 
 government*^ general controls on local authorities* current 
expenditure and upon authorities* approaches to determining 
priorities between services within the context of these controls. 
The House of Commons Transport Committee, in fact, expressed 
reservations about the implications of such a situation for 
future maintenance expenditure: 
It seems entirely wrong that adequate standards of road 
maintenance should depend upon the willingness of local 
authorities to exceed Government expenditure targets, a 
willingness which would be more constrained in the 
future. 11" 
With the reform of the TSG system road maintenance became fully 
absorbed into the general block grant system in 1985/86, block 
grant support being provided for an authority's services as a 
whole and distributed between authorities on the basis of a 
formula in which GRE plays a major role. Authorities* spending 
on road maintenance is now subject to the same considerations as 
spending on most other services and dependent upon a balance of 
considerations relating to local perceptions of needs and 
political priorities, the relationship between block grant 
entitlement and the level of spending relative to GRE, the 
corresponding burden on local ratepayers and, possibly, the 
prospect of rate-capping. 
The reservations about how road maintenance would fare in this 
new situation would appear to have been confirmed to some degree 
by the continued decline in local authorities* maintenance 
expenditure in 1985/86 resulting in an underspend relative tothe 
Government's provision nationally for the first time since 
1980/81. This was consistent with the continued reduction in 
block grant support and the increased severity of penalties for 
overspending targets. Of particular significance is the decline 
in maintenance expenditure in London reversing the increasing 
trend of previous years, indicating the impact of general 
expenditure restraints in the absence of TSG and, in particular, 
of the introduction of rate-capping. 
The picture since 1985/86 is complicated by the abolition in 
March 1986 of the GLC and metropolitan counties and the 
replacement of the system of targets and penalties by a 
modification to the basic block grant system which introduced a 
negative marginal grant rate with the rate of loss of grant 
accelerated when spending exceeds the *thresholdr level (see 
section 2.2 above) . With the abolition of the GLC and MCCs, road 
maintenance became the full responsibility of the borough and 
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district councils which have a wider range of services than'the 
former 'upper tier1 authorities. Therefore, decision making in 
these areas about road maintenance budgets now takes place in 
broader context in which a wide range of services compete for 
scarce resources. 
since 1985/86 the Government has increased provision for local 
authorities' road maintenance expenditure significantly in real 
terms (see Figure 2) arguing that this reflects " the high 
priority the Government gives to maintaining the local road 
network."" However, although local authorities have responded 
by increasing their expenditure, the increase has not matched the 
Government's provision, resulting in a growing underspend which, 
on 1987/88 budget data, had reached 12%. Underspending against 
GRE is particularly marked in the shire counties. Our analysis 
suggests that two factors are important in explaining this 
situation. 
First, restraints on expenditure by central government have 
continued and have presented local authorities with some 
difficulties. Thus, the contribution of block grant support for 
local government expenditure continued to decline, from 35% of 
relevant expenditure in 1985/86 to 32% in 1987/88. More 
specifically, the increase in provision for road maintenance by 
the Government has not been matched by an equivalent increase in 
the maintenance GRE, as shown in Figure 2. This has contributed 
to the restraint on block grant and, indeed, it can be seen as 
somewhat disingenuous on the part of the Government, on the one 
hand, to emphasise its commitment to road maintenance on the 
basis of increased provision and, on the other hand, to imply 
through the level of GRE that authorities do not need to spend 
the provision in order to achieve adequate standards. 
Therefore, local authorities have not been provided with the 
resources by central government which would allow them to achieve 
standards of road maintenance implied by the Government's plans. 
Any move to increase spending by authorities (unless at the 
expense of other services) results in loss of block grant, 
increased burden on local ratepayers and eventually the prospect 
of rate-capping, and in such a context of restraint road 
maintenance spending has suffered. 
Thus, we find evidence in several authorities of planned 
increases in maintenance spending having to be reduced or 
sacrificed due to the impact of expenditure restraints. The most 
relevant factors, following the reform of the TSG system, are the 
negative marginal rate of block grant and the authority's GRE. 
An example of the problem is provided by Avon County Council: 
... in assessing the overall financial position facing the 
County Council as a result of the Rate Support Grant, it was 
apparent that the County Council would lose some £36 million 
of grant in total between 1985/86 and 1986/87 if it spent 
at the overall expenditure levels proposed by Central 
Government in each year. This meant that it has not been 
possible to include . . . (a real) . . .increase in the 
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allocation to highway maintenance. '195 
The general local authority perspective on the problem is perhaps 
best summarised in a recent report to the West Midlands Regional 
Forum: 
I' The fact is that, due to the constraints placed upon local 
authorities1 current expenditure by the Government's Rate 
Support Grant system, it is not possible for . . . (an) . . . 
increased level of expenditure to be achieved without a 
severe impact on future rate levels or reductions of 
expenditure in other policy areas. There is a need for the 
Government to revise the grant system to enable local 
authorities to incur expenditure on road maintenance up to 
the PESC provision. The operation of the current system can 
only lead to the continuing deterioration of local roads in 
the Region. "" 
However, there is another dimension to the problem which is 
suggested in the above comment and which, indeed, is emphasised 
by the Government in their perspective. This is the approach 
adopted by local authorities to the determination of priorities 
between their various services for the resources which are 
available within the framework of controls exercised by central 
government. We have seen that the Government's view is that 
adequate standards of roadmaintenance could be achieved if local 
authorities assigned sufficiently high priority to road 
maintenance. 97 Indeed, we found evidence that the degree of 
priority assigned by an authority to road maintenance is a 
significant factor influencing its ability to address road 
maintenance needs given the broader restraints on the total 
resources available. However, our analysis suggests that 
authorities in general face considerable difficulties in 
assigning a high priority to road maintenance in a context where 
they face pressing demands for additional resources from a wide 
range of other services and where any increase in total spending 
results in a loss of block grant. 
Thus, underspending by local authorities on road maintenance 
contrasts with general overspending on other services such as 
education and social services. Amongst our selected authorities 
maintenance expenditure tended to be lower relative to its GRE 
than was the case for other services. Most authorities whose 
total expenditure exceeded GRE budgeted below GRE for 
maintenance, while in those whosetotal expenditure was below GRE 
the shortfall on maintenance tended to be larger than average. 
The problem faced by authorities in assigning high priority to 
road maintenance appears to have been exacerbated in London and 
the metropolitan areas by the abolition of the GLC and MCCs which 
has placed road maintenance in a situation of having to compete 
against a wider range of services for constrained resources. The 
situation is made more difficult by the fact that the London 
boroughs and metropolitan districts have long-established 
priorities for such services as education, social services, 
housing and community and leisure services which are a reflection 
of perceptions of local needs. It is clear that these 
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authorities face economic and social problems of considerable 
magnitude and the determination of priorities for the use of 
limited resources to address these problems is the essential 
political purpose of elected local authorities in which there is 
a convention of considerable autonomy and discretion. It is in 
the interaction between local decision-making on resource 
priorities and central controls on the resources available to 
local authorities that the explanation of the problem of local 
road maintenance lies. 
Our analysis suggests that the reform of the TSG system has had 
an influence on the development of the problem but at a secondary 
level and we have no clear evidence to suggest that the retention 
of the old TSG system would have altered the picture 
fundamentally. The influence of the reform can be seen both at 
the level of central expenditure control and at the level of 
local decision-making. As regards the former, the reform had a 
redistributive effect in terms of the allocation of resources 
between authorities. The change to allocation totally on the 
basis of GRE, in which road length is the main criterion of 
'need', benefitted authorities with high road mileages relative 
to population. Therefore, larger shire counties tended to 
benefit at the expense of smaller and more densely populated 
counties and, more generally, the shire counties benefitted at 
the expense of London and the metropolitan areas (see Figure 7). 
As regards the impact on local decision making, the loss of TSG 
support for road maintenance has exposed it to a greater degree 
of competition form other services in budgetary considerations 
and , as we have seen, the structure of local authorities1 
priorities have tended to disadvantage road maintenance with very 
high perceived opportunity costs. 
The problem in terms of resource allocation to local road 
maintenance is reflected in the material condition of local 
roads, with a continued trend of deterioration. The major area 
of concern continues to be the structural condition of roads and 
this is reflected in the priority given to structural works 
within the increases in spending since 1985/86, particularly on 
major roads. This has led to a rapid deterioration in minor 
roads and footways and concern about this trend has led some 
authorities to consider re-ordering priorities. However, in the 
present climate of expenditure restraint there would appear to 
be rather limited scope for a shift in priorities to address 
needs on the whole road network unless authorities are prepared 
to re-direct resources from other services. Our analysis would 
suggest that the prospects for this are limited given present 
patterns of needs and priorities. It is possible to see an 
argument for such a modification of priorities in the evidence 
of considerable public dissatisfaction with the state of local 
roads but such evidence must be considered in relation to local 
peoples' views on problems and needs in other services and, at 
the end of the day, it is for individual local authorities to 
determine their priorities on the basis of available evidence on 
needs across the whole range of their services and of local 
political preferences. 
This brings us to the question of how the problem of local road 
maintenance might be addressed so as to ensure that a more 
adequate level of resources can be directed to the achievement 
of standards which are generally perceived to be 'satisfactory'. 
We now turn to this question in the next section. 
4.4 Towards a Solution to the Road Maintenance Problem 
Our analysis indicates that there are two main issues which need 
to be addressed. The first concerns the level of resources made 
available by central government for local road maintenance, the 
basis upon which such resources are provided to local 
authorities, and the controls and restraints exercisedby central 
government over local authoritiest spending behaviour. The 
second issue concerns the approach adopted by local authorities, 
within this context, to the determination of priorities between 
various services, the allocation of resources to those services, 
and to ensuring that resources are used effectively and 
efficiently in producing service outputs to meet the needs of 
local communities. 
In our view, an adequate approach to the problem of local road 
maintenance requires developments onboth these fronts. To focus 
on one aspect alone represents a partial and inadequate response. 
A recent analysis of the problem by the Audit Commission does 
indeed address both these aspects although the emphasis tends to 
be more in line with the Government's perspective on the ways in 
which local authorities should direct more resources toggoad 
maintenance and use them more effectively and efficiently. 
We have two main reservations about the Audit Commissionts 
analysis. The first relates to the use of the maintenance GRE 
to indicate desirable levels of spending by local authorities. 
The problem here is that GRE is not a good measure of the 
resources actually needed by authorities to maintain their roads 
to adequate standards, especially those with roads in below 
average condition and those in more heavily urbanised areas with 
special needs. Our second reservation relates to the Audit 
Commissionts assumption that needs-based budgeting for road 
maintenance will necessarily result in an increase in resources 
for maintenance. Here, the Audit Commission abstracts the road 
maintenance problem from the broader problem faced by local 
authorities in directing adequate resources to address 
effectively the whole range of local problems and needs which 
they face. From this broader view of effectiveness needs-based 
budgeting requires to be introduced across the whole range of 
local authority services. However, this would be likely to 
generate justifiable demands for additional spending from many 
services which could only be resolved, within constrained 
resources, by the determination of priorities by electedmembers. 
This brings us back to the present problem of the relative 
priority assigned to road maintenance. 
The Audit Commission's approach is, in our view, too narrow 
especially in relation to the action required by central 
government. Local authorities justifiably could expect moves on 
their part to 'put their house in order' to be supported by moves 
by central government to ensure, firstly, an adequate level of 
expenditure provision to meet road maintenance needs to 
satisfactory standards and, secondly, that the distribution of 
these resources to local authorities reflects more accurately 
their actual needs. In such a context local authorities would 
be expectedto introduce measures to improve their effectiveness 
in resource allocation and to secure efficiency improvements 
which could release more resources for productive use in 
addressing their local problems and needs. 
However, there remains the central problem of how *satisfactory 
standards of road maintenance are to be defined. To what extent 
should local authorities be free to determine service priorities 
and standards in accordance with local circumstances and the 
preferences of local communities or should minimum national 
standards be designated for each type of road? The Audit 
Commission advocates the latter course butthis is a contentious 
issue which goes to the heart of the tension in our political 
system between local autonomy and central control. The point 
remains, however, that if the Government is to make resources 
available for local road maintenance on the basis of defined 
needs there will require to be a definition of minimum standards 
of maintenance and an assessment of the resources needed to bring 
existing road conditions up to these standards. In our view, the 
local authority associations' 'Code of Good Practice* provides 
a sound basis for defining appropriate minimum standards with 
local authorities being free to set higher standards at their 
discretion according to local circumstances and financed from 
local resources. 
This approach could be implementedthroughthe TPP system without 
an excessive degree of central direction and bureaucracy. I 
Authorities would submit bids for maintenance resources based on 
assessed needs relative to the defined minimum standards. 
Central government would set national expenditure provision on 
the basis of this information and having determined a target 
level of improvement in road conditions in the context of a 
programme to bring conditions up to the defined minimum standards 
nationally. Resources could then be allocated to authorities 
on the basis of their needs either through block grant, if an 
appropriate 'needs factor* could be incorporated into the GRE 
formula, or through a supplementary grant. This issue would need 
to be discussed by the Government and local authority 
associations bearing in mind the reform of local government 
finance to be introduced in April 1990. It would be crucial to 
ensure that local authorities actually received the resources to 
support the required maintenance programmes. For their part, 
authorities would provide evidence in their TPPs of performance 
and progress in meeting defined needs and standards and in 
improving efficiency. 
On the basis of such a joint approach by central and local 
government there would be good prospects for reversing the 
deteriorating trend in the condition of local roads as part of 
a broader improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
local government services. However, the actual prospects are 
uncertain not least because of recent trends in relations between 
central and local government. Thus, moves towards increased 
central control and financial restraint have not produced a 
climate which is conducive to an approach to the road maintenance 
problem which exploits fullythe potential and strengths of local 
government working in 'partnership8 with central government. 
The situation is not helped by the uncertainty generated by the 
planned reform of local government finance in April 1990. Since 
some three quarters of total local authority current expenditure 
will be under direct central government control in the new system 
much will depend on the degree of restraint exercised by the 
Government via grant support. If such support is restrained 
authorities will find it difficult to increase expenditure 
because of the impact on individuals via increases in the 
community charge. In view of the pattern of relative service 
priorities which our analysis has indicated as pertaining over 
recent years there must be some concern about the prospects for 
road maintenance under the new system. Such concern reinforces 
the case for an initiative by central and local government in 
partnership to reverse the trend of deterioration in local 
authority roads. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The Conservative Government has pursued an intensive programme 
of legislative reform since 1979 with the aim of achieving 
greater control over local government expenditure and of bringing 
such expenditure into line with central government objectives and 
spending plans. This programme can be seen as part of a broader 
economic and political strategy to reduce the role of the public 
sector and, conversely, to promote a flourishing and profitable 
private sector. Initially, the Government was not successful in 
achieving the desired degree of control over local transport 
expenditure. During the period up to 1984 there was a 
considerable degree of overspending by local authorities relative 
to the Government's plans, particularly on public transport in 
London and the metropolitan counties. This can be seen as due 
primarily to the policies and priorities of Labour Councils in 
these areas, developed in relation to their perceptions of local 
needs in a context of economic recession, which were at odds 
with the Government's priorities. On the other hand, local 
authorities consistently underspent relative to the Government's 
plans for roads capital expenditure, frustrating the Government's 
objectives for the promotion of the construction of roads to 
serve commercial and business traffic. 
Since 1984, however, there have been considerable changes in the 
level and pattern of local transport expenditure; in particular, 
expenditure on local public transport has been reduced and 
brought substantially into line with the Government's plans. 
This has been achieved primarily by measures to reduce local 
authority control and discretion over public transport provision 
in the major conurbations. The focus has shifted subsequently 
to expenditure on local roads and specifically to the problem of 
the recent emergence of a significant underspend relative to the 
Government's plans for expenditure on local road construction and 
maintenance. 
However, of greater importance to our analysis is what this 
situation implies for the ability of local authorities 
effectively to address their local transport problems and needs. 
Our research has indicated that over recent years local 
authorities have been unable to allocate sufficient resources to 
local road construction and maintenance to meet their assessed 
needs and that this has resulted in the exacerbation of local 
transport problems. Therefore, in terms of the effectiveness of 
local roads policy there are two aspects to the problem: firstly, 
the failure of expenditure to conform to the Government's plans; 
and, secondly, the failure of local authorities to address 
effectively their local needs. 
Our explanation for these failures focuses on the tension 
inherent in our political system between, on the one hand, 
interests in the central state concerned to achieve control over 
the allocation of public resources in order to achieve their 
promoted objectives and, on the other hand, interests in the 
local state concerned to preserve the maximum possible degree 
of autonomy and discretion over the use and allocation of 
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resources in the localities. More specifically then, 'our 
explanation emphasises the interaction between, on the one hand, 
factors relatingtothe capacity of central government to control 
local government expenditure through the framework of controls 
established for this purpose and, on the other hand, factors 
relating to the response of local authorities to the pressures 
exercised through this framework in the determination of their 
priorities for the use of resources to address the perceived 
problems and needs of their areas. 
The Government's expenditure control framework can be seen to 
embody two main sources of tension. The first arises between 
interests within central government which have rather different 
control purposes. Thus, certain departmental interests are 
concerned to influence the distribution of resources between 
different types of expenditure while certain interests are more 
concerned to achieve control of the overall level of public 
expenditure. This tension is embodied in the annual 
deliberations of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) 
and would be manifested, for example, in conflict between the DTp 
and the Treasury over the scale of resources for local roads 
expenditure. The second source of tension is the more general 
and apparent one referred to above between these interests of 
central government and those of local government in maintaining 
a substantial degree of autonomy from central control in order 
to determine local expenditure priorities in accordance with 
local considerations. 
The problems which we have identified with local roads 
expenditure can be seen as arising in part form these tensions. 
On the one hand, the systems for central government control over 
local authorities' expenditure do not provide the ca~acitv for 
control at the level of detail required to ensure that such 
expenditure conforms to central spending objectives and plans. 
This produces a problem of unintended consemences which is 
exacerbated by the conflicting interests within central 
government. These limits to central control are further 
reinforced by the principle and tradition of local authorities' 
freedom and discretion to determine their own priorities within 
parameters set by central government. Two problems arise from 
the local authorities' point of view. First, plans and 
assumptions made by central government may fail to match the 
reality faced by individual authorities which are, therefore, 
unable to deliver expenditure outputs which are consistent with 
the Government's objectives or adequate to meet their local 
needs. Second, in exercisingtheir local autonomy and discretion 
within parameters of central control, authorities may choose not 
to deliver expenditure outputs consistent with the Government's 
objectives. Authorities must establish priorities based upon 
their perceptions of local circumstances balanced against the 
effects of central control and therefore must choose which local 
problems and needs are to be addressed and to what degree. When 
priorities have to be established, the sum of local decisions 
may not sum to the centrally determined view. 
Therefore, in our view, an understanding of recent problems over 
*. . - 
5 0 
local roads expenditure must be based upon an analysis of the'two 
basic factors of capacity for central control and the scope of 
local discretion. We would argue that problems have arisen in 
large part because,. given the limits to central control deriving 
from tensions withln central government, from formal limits to 
central government intervention and from a strong tradition of 
local discretion, the Government can be seen, firstly, as 
demanding too much from its control mechanisms, and, secondly, 
as expecting too much from local government if long-established 
principles of local autonomy and discretion are to be taken 
seriously. 
The problems which have arisen over expenditure on local road 
construction and improvement can be understood in terms of the 
above framework. Thus, the Government's approach over the years 
to local authorities1 use of capital receipts has been 
conditioned primarily by the concern to control total capital 
expenditure. The approach adopted reflected formal limits on 
central government intervention and an interest in controlling 
expenditure overall. In practice the application of the capital 
expenditure control system has created difficulties for many 
authorities firstly because of an inability to generate 
sufficient spending power and, secondly, because of difficulties 
in assigning priority to roads expenditure relative to other 
services. The resulting underspend on local roads can be seen 
from one point of view, therefore, as an 'unintended consequence1 
deriving from the limits of central government to achieve its 
plans and objectives with the available control mechanisms. From 
this point of view the inability of local authorities1 to address 
their local problems and needs is due to an inappropriate system 
of central government control which fails to accommodate both the 
reality of local circumstances and the exercise of local autonomy 
and discretion. 
The alternative interpretation of the problem places greater 
emphasis upon the intentional behaviour of local authorities in I 
setting priorities for resource allocation between services 
within the broader framework of central government control. From 
this point of view the failure of local authorities to address 
their local problems and needs is due to their failure to assign 
sufficient priority to roads expenditure for the resources which 
are available. We have seen that the Government and local 
authorities have tended to adopt different viewpoints in the 
explanation of the problem arising from a selective emphasis on 
different elements in the broader explanatory framework which we 
have elaborated. From our perspective such viewpoints must be 
seen as partial and limited and serving particular sets of 
interests in the central and local state, tension between which 
has become an important characteristic of our political system. 
The reform of the TSG system can be understood in terms of our 
explanatory framework. Before the change introduced in 1985 TSG 
was a block grant to support authorities in their development of 
integratedtransport policies and programmes. Our analysis leads 
us to conclude that the operation of the TSG system per se cannot 
be seen as the main cause of the Governmentls frustration with 
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local authorities' spending behaviour up to 1984/85 but it'did 
contribute to the problem in the context of the operation of the 
Government's broader expenditure control systems. On the one 
hand, as an unhypothecated grant it served to support patterns 
of expenditure arising from the priorities of authorities in the 
major conurbations which differed radically from those of the 
Government. On the other hand, it added complexity to the system 
of control of local authority expenditure, providing authorities 
with an additional 'degree of discretion' within the broader 
framework of central government control mechanisms. 
Therefore, the TSG system can be seen as to some degree 'out of 
step' with the Government's concern in the early 1980s to achieve 
greater control over local transport expenditure in terms of both 
level and composition. It reduced the Government's capacity for 
control through both the above factors of increased complexity 
and increased local discretion. This can be seen particularly 
in the 1983/84 TSG settlement which was influenced by the 
introduction of PELS by the 1983 Transport Act such that greater 
support was provided to the GLC and MCCs at the expense of the 
Shire counties. This contradicted the Government's objectives 
by providing more resources to the discretion of authorities 
whose priorities to public transport expenditure were the main 
source of the Government's frustration while providing less 
resources to those authorities who were central to the 
Government's emerging priorities for the promotion of road 
construction and improvement. Therefore, in part, the TSG system 
exacerbated the 'unintentional consequences' of the Government's 
control systems by increasing complexity (and the potential for 
lack of co-ordinationbetweenvarious Governmentdepartments) and 
by increasing the scope for influence of conflicting interests 
within central government. However, the TSG system also 
increased the ability of local authorities to choose not to 
deliver expenditure outputs in accordance with the Government's 
plans. 
The Government's rationale for the reform of the TSG system was, 
as we have seen, consistent with its broader viewpoint on the 
problem of local transport expenditure, emphasising this role of 
TSG in supporting local authorities' ability to pursue transport 
spending programmes at odds with central expenditure plans. The 
actual reform of the system restricting TSG support from 1985/86 
to capital expenditure on roads 'of more than local importance', 
serving primarily heavy and longer distance traffic, can be seen 
as consistent with the Government's broader strategy to achieve 
control over local authorities' expenditure and conformity with 
central spending plans, involving a shift of resources away from 
public transport and towards roads. 
The reform of the TSG system, therefore, can be seen as one of 
a series of radical measures introduced during the Conservative 
Government's second term of office which have addressed 
specifically the scope of local authorities' discretion to 
develop expenditure priorities at odds with central government 
plans. Such measures also include the transfer of responsibility 
for public transport in London to LRT, the abolition of the GLC 
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and MCCs and the deregulation of local bus services. The'net 
result of these changes has been a direct reduction in the role 
of local authorities in decision making about resource allocation 
to public transport and a restriction on the discretion of local 
authorities to derive integrated and co-ordinated plans for the 
development of local transport services and facilities to meet 
the perceived needs of the communities they represent, in which 
public transport, in particular, can be supported to achieve 
objectives expressing the broader economic and social welfare of 
those communities. 
More generally, there has been an increase in the ascendancy of 
central government plans over locally-determined policies and 
priorities. The reform of the TSG system has contributed to 
this process and can be seen as perhaps reflecting the 
Government's broaderthinking about the role of local government. 
Thus, TSG is now essentially a specific grant to persuade local 
authorities to construct roads which they might not otherwise 
give priority, primarily orientedtothe needs of longer-distance 
business and commercial traffic rather than to the needs of local 
communities - that is, to persuade local authorities to act 
primarily as the acrent of central government. In this sense it 
is radically different from the original TSG which was a general 
grant for use at authorities' discretion to support the 
development of broader transport plans and programmes to meet the 
perceived needs of local communities in such a way as to promote 
local co-ordination and integration - that is, to encouracre local 
authorities to exercise discretion in serving local communities. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that the ability of the Government to 
achieve this increased ascendancy in practice is limited by the 
nature of current control mechanisms. The Government's response 
to the problem has not been to recognise the inappropriateness 
of the degree of control it is seeking to exercise but rather to 
seek to enhance the degree of control through reforms of the 
system of local government finance. New systems for controlling 
local authorities' current and capital expenditure are to be 
introduced in April 1990 with the stated intention of improving 
local accountability defined in terms ofthe relationship between 
the spending behaviour of local authorities and changes in the 
tax burden on local voters. 
As regards current expenditure there will be three main 
changes ." First, domestic rates will be replaced by a f lat-rate 
'community charge' to be levied on all adults (ie persons aged 
18 years and over). Second, non-domestic rates will be changed 
from a tax levied at variable rates by different local 
authorities into a uniform national business rate (UBR) 
determined by central government which will be index-linked with 
the proceeds distributed to local authorities on an equal amount 
per adult basis. Third, the grant system will be simplified with 
the conversion of the present block grant system into two lump- 
sum grants: a 'needs grant' to compensate for differences in 
assessed spending needs per adult between authorities; and a 
'standard grantt providing an additional contribution from 
national taxation towards the cost of local services, again 
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distributed on a per adult basis. Moreover, needs assessment 
will be undertaken on the basis of a simplified approach to 
assessing GREs. 
In the new system authorities will receive from central 
government a fixed sum at the start of each financial year 
comprising the needs and standard element of grant plus a share 
of UBR income. This allocation from central government, which 
is likelyto constitute about three-quarters of total revenue for 
most authorities, will be invariant with authorities' spending 
levels; income from the community charge will make up the 
remaining required revenue and the full cost of marginal 
increases in spending (and the full benefit of marginal 
decreases) will be felt by lacal community charge payers. Since 
the charge is levied on a simple per capita basis and all adults 
have to pay at least a 20% contribution (following the 1986 
Social Security Act) marginal changes in local authorities1 
spending will be felt most by lower income people. 
Changes in the capital expenditure control system are designed 
to compleme~; the reforms in the financing of revenue 
expenditure. The new system will apply to all capital 
expenditure with no distinction between 'prescribed' and 'non- 
prescribed' categories. Authorities will have three sources of 
spending power for financing capital commitments. First, they 
will be able to borrow up to the limit of annual 'credit 
approvals' specified by the Government. A 'basic credit 
approval' will cover all categories of expenditure and may be 
used at the authority's discretion while 'supplementary credit 
approvals' will be issued in respect of borrowing for specified 
programmes or projects (eg TSG expenditure net of grant). 
Second, authorities may obtain grants from central government or 
other public bodies (eg EEC) but these will be allowed for in 
credit approvals. Third, authorities may apply their own 
resources. The main source of such resources for many 
authorities will be capital receipts but the Government will I 
restrict the proportion of receipts which authorities can use for 
new capital investment by 'prescribing' proportions to be set 
aside for debt redemption and for financing future capital 
expenditure in substitution for external borrowing. Authorities 
will also be able to use profits from trading undertakings and 
make unrestricted revenue contributions to capital expenditure, 
the only discipline on the latter being the impact on the 
community charge. 
These changes are designed to overcome the problem which we 
analyzed in Section 3 above deriving from aggregate assumptions 
about the availability of capital receipts which discriminate 
against authorities with below average actual receipts. In the 
new system, credit approvals will, in effect, 'top up' 
authorities' actual spending power from receipts to a level 
consistent with the Government's assessment of their appropriate 
share of the provisions in central spending plans. Spending may 
then be supplemented by revenue contributions at the discretion 
of individual authorities but, of course, such marginal increases 
in expenditure will have to be borne entirely by local community 
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charge payers. 
 his new system of local government finance will result in a 
greater degree of central control over local authority 
expenditure. On the one hand, it should improve the Government's 
capacity for control reducing the scope for 'unintended 
consequences'. On the other hand, it will effectively constrain 
local authorities in the exercise of local discretion to the 
extent that it results in increased expenditure to be financed 
wholly from a community charge which will impact most heavily on 
lower income people. Thus, some three-quarters of total local 
authority revenue for current expenditure will be under direct 
government control and will be fixed at the beginning of each 
financial year. By taking account of individual authoritiesr 
capital receipts and topping up spending power via credit 
approvals to a perceived level of need to spend, central 
government will achieve a greater degree of control over total 
capital expenditure. The impact upon local authorities' 
perceived 'room formanoeuvrer (discretion) in spending decisions 
will depend firstly upon the degree of restraint exercised by the 
Government via grant support and credit approval and, secondly, 
upon local political perceptions of the effect of increased 
spending on local people. 
However, based upon our analysis we have two major reservations 
about the possible impact of these changes to the systems of 
local government financial control on local transport 
expenditure, and particularly on the ability of local authorities 
to address effectively their transport needs. The first 
reservation relates tothis issue of control and the Government's 
ability to achieve expenditure outcomes in accordance with its 
spending plans. The new system will tighten up control overall 
but will still leave local authorities free, within given 
constraints, to determine their own priorities. If authorities 
find that the resources available to meet local needs are 
restrained further both by central government controls and by the 
'discipline' of the community charge they will have to make 
difficult decisions on local priorities. Our analysis has 
indicated that over recent years roads expenditure has tended to 
'lose out' to other services in the process of setting priorities 
for constrained resources. In the light of this pattern of 
relative service priorities there must be some concern about the 
prospects for roads expenditure under the new system. 
This concern would apply to both current expenditure and 
maintenance and capital expenditure on local road construction 
and improvement. We have seen that the condition of local 
authority roads has deteriorated over recent years partly due to 
resource restraints exercised by central government and partly 
due to the difficulties experienced by local authorities, in the 
context of such restraints, in assigning priority to road 
maintenance relative to the wide range of other services which 
face pressing demands for additional resources. We can foresee 
an exacerbation of this problem under the new system of local 
government finance unless steps are taken by central and local 
government in partnership to address the issue along the lines 
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proposed in section 4.4 above. 
As regards the construction and improvement of local roads, we 
have seen that restraints on capital expenditure have resulted 
in inadequate expenditure by local authorities on non-TSG 
programmes directed to meet specifically local needs. Such 
expenditure has been 'squeezed' in a situation where spending is 
constrained, where TSG supports expenditure on roads 'of more 
than local importance', and where other local authority services 
compete for priority for the available capital resources. Under 
the new capital control system much will depend on the degree of 
restraint imposed by the Government and its approach to 
distributing basic credit approvals to authorities. Although 
those authorities with below-average capital receipts should 
benefit under the new system, we have reservations about the 
prospects for capital expenditure on local transport schemes in 
a situation where expenditure on TSG schemes will be effectively 
'ring-fenced' by supplementary credit approval, and where 
authorities will have to make difficult decisions about relative 
service priorities for limited resources. 
There are grounds for fears about the impact of the new systems 
of local government finance on the northern metropolitan 
authorities in particular. In the new system for financing 
current expenditure there will be no resource equalisation 
mechanism in grant distribution related to differences in 
rateable values. Therefore, authorities with relatively low 
rateable resources which benefit at present from resource 
equalisation (mainly in northern England) will lose out under the 
new system, while those with high rateable resources (mainly in 
southern, eastern and central England) will gain. This effect 
will be magnified for those northern authorities (particularly 
in the larger urban areas) where spending is high relative to GRE 
and whose non-domestic rates are above the national average, 
because they will lose out in the allocation of the uniform 
business rate. Although 'safety nets' will spread the impacts 
over a period of years, the long-term result is likely to be 
severe constraints on the resources made available by central 
government to local authorities in the northern urban areas. A 
greater burden will be placed on the community charge but concern 
about its impact on lower income people in these areas is likely 
to make it difficult for these authorities to increase 
expenditure to meet perceived needs. 
Capital expenditure in these authorities may also be subject to 
a greater degree of restraint under the new system for two 
reasons. The first is the requirement to set aside substantial 
'prescribed' proportions of capital receipts to pay off debt and 
to finance future capital expenditure in substitution for 
external borrowing. The second factor is the Government's 
proposed procedure for distributing basic credit approvals to 
authorities which will effectively redistribute spending power 
in favour of authorities with lower levels of non-prescribed 
receipts. The northern metropolitan authorities are likely to 
experience the greatest difficulties because of their relatively 
high levels of captial receipts at present. In addition, of 
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course, any revenue contributions to capital expenditure wili be 
subject to considerations of the impact of the community charge 
as for current spending. 
The prospects for roads capital expenditure in northern local 
authorities is also affected by the trend in the contribution of 
central government resources for road construction which, we have 
seen, have tended to favour growth areas of the south at the 
expense of the north in recent years. Although we have little 
evidence for f inn argument, there would appear to be some grounds 
for fears that road building may support and strenthen a 
'virtuous circle' of growth and development in the south and 
therefore underpin a widening of the so-called 'north-south 
divide1. Much depends on the approach adopted by the Government 
to the assessment of need as a basis for distributing TSG and 
other capital spending power between authorities. 
In our view, there would appear to be difficult times ahead for 
the northern metropolitan authorities. In particular, we have 
seen that these authorities have experienced some difficulties 
in assigning priority to local roads expenditure since the 
abolition of the MCCs in a situation where a wide range of urban 
economic and social problems result in pressing demands for more 
resources for education, social services, housing, community and 
leisure services, economic development etc. In view of this 
pattern of priorities and the prospect of increased expenditure 
restraints under the new financial regime, we fear that 
expenditure on roads in the northern urban areas may suffer 
particularly badly, resulting in an exacerbation of urban 
transport problems. 
There is, indeed, an additional factor which strengthens the 
cause for concern about future transport problems in the northern 
urban areas. This relates to the extent to which resources from 
central government are distributed in a way which reflects 
adequately the needs of these areas. We referred above to the I 
question of need assessment for the distribution of TSG and other 
capital spending power. The DTp is placing increasing emphasis 
on quantitative assessment of benefits from road schemes and the 
question arises of the extent to which all relevant needs can be 
considered adequately within such a framework. There is also the 
question of the degree to which the quantitative interpretation 
of the criteria for TSG support within the evaluation framework 
makes justification for such support more difficult in large 
urban areas. 
We are aware that certain metropolitan authorities have voiced 
the concern that GREs fail to reflect adequately the needs of 
large urban areas subject to heavy traffic use, large numbers of 
utility openings and a wide range of inner city problems 
requiring attention with scarce resources. Indeed, in our 
analysis of the road maintenance problem we criticise the current 
GRE on the grounds that it fails to take into account the actual 
condition of roads pertaining in 1985/86 when TSG support was 
discontinued. A major determinant of need for maintenance 
expenditure is the maintenance Ibacklog' but the GRE does not 
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reflect adequately the difference in severity of this prolilem 
between authorities. The evidence for the National Road 
Maintenance Condition Survey concerning the substantial 
maintenance backlog on urban principal roads in particular lends 
support to the contention that the maintenance GRE failed to 
reflect adequately the needs of authorities in larger urban 
areas. 
Therefore, there are two bases for concern on the part of such 
authorities about the extent to which resources from central 
government will meet their needs under the new system of local 
government finance. First, part of their grant (the 'standard 
grant') will be paid on a per capita basis and therefore will not 
be related directly to assessed need. Second, the part of their 
grant which will be related to assessed need will be distributed 
to authorities on the basis of GREs which have limitations as 
measures of the actual needs of local authorities. These 
considerations strengthen our fears for the future ability of 
local authorities in the northern metropolitan areas in 
particular to address effectively their transport problems and 
needs. 
However, the assessment of effectiveness in meeting needs is an 
extremely complex task. In particular, the differences in 
priorities between central government andmany local authorities, 
arising from conflicts between interests and values, result in 
different perspectives on effectiveness. We discussed this at 
some length in section 3.4 but we can summarise some of the 
issues here. From the Government's point of view, priority to 
the promotion of economic growth and, in such a context, to the 
needs of business and commercial traffic in particular is an 
important basis for the provision of TSG support for capital 
expenditure on roads 'of more than local importance'. A further 
objective is the relief of communities from through traffic, 
especially heavy lorries. The degree of competition between 
local authority schemes for the available resources and the use 
of the 'Annex B' evaluation framework are seen by the Government 
as important factors promoting effectiveness in the use of 
resources. But certain questions can be posed which have a 
bearing on the issue of effectiveness. Is the total level of 
resources allocated to TSG schemes appropriate in view of the 
opportunities foregone through possible alternative uses? To 
what extent would the schemes which have attracted TSG support 
have been implemented by local authorities in the absence of such 
support (given the opportunity through the general capital 
control system)? To what extent is road investment supported by 
TSG effective in achieving the Government's broad priority 
objective of promoting economic growth? 
As regards local transport needs central government provides a 
legislative framework within which local authorities must operate 
and provides resources to local authorities on the basis of a 
scrutiny of their policies as set out in TPPs and in accordance 
with centrally-determined priorities. Therefore, central 
government sets 'parameters' for local authorities who must work 
within these parameters in meeting local needs. We have seen 
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that these parameters have been tightened in recent years through 
the expenditure control systems, through the reform of the TSG 
system and through deregulation of local bus services. These 
changes can be seen as part of an attempt by central government 
to change the parameters so as to promote greater effectiveness 
by local authorities where such effectiveness is defined in 
relation to the Government's view of objectives and priorities. 
Because of the substantial discrepancy between the Government's 
view of priorities and that of many local authorities there has, 
of course, arisen a dispute about the cause of problems of 
effectiveness in meeting local transport needs. From the 
viewpoint of central government, such problems are due mainly to 
the behaviour of local authorities, specifically their failure 
to use available resources to meet local needs in accordance with 
centrally-determined priorities. We have seen this viewpoint in 
the Government's criticisms of local authorities' underspending 
on roads capital and current expenditure. However, from the 
viewpoint of local government problems of effectiveness in 
meeting local needs are due mainly to the 'parameters' set by 
central government which are seen as imposing a restraint on the 
ability of local authorities to meet the needs of their areas as 
assessed and prioritised locally. We have seen this viewpoint 
in local authorities' criticisms of resource constraints which 
lie behind their inability to allocate sufficient resources to 
local roads expenditure given the wide range of priority needs 
which they face. In our view, there can be no 'objective 
resolution' of this conflict of viewpoints; in essence, it 
depends upon one's belief in the extent to which central 
government should seek to control local authorities within 'tight 
parameters' so as to ensure that they behave in accordance with 
centrally-determined priorities or, alternatively, the extent to 
which local authorities should be free to raise and allocate 
resources to meet local needs in accordance with locally- 
determined priorities, within relatively 'loose parameterse set 
by central government. Such a belief, of course, is located in 
a broader 'world-view' or paradigm comprising sets of inter- 
related political values and beliefs which condition the 
perception and analysis of problems. 
A further important 'belief-conflict' whichunderlies the dispute 
about effectiveness in meeting local transport needs goes to the 
heart of the conflict in 'world-views' between the present 
Government and many of the local authorities which have 
responsibility for dealing with urban transport problems. 
Essentially, this conflict relates to the extent to which it is 
believed that transport services and facilities in urban areas 
should be provided in accordance with market principles or, 
alternatively, should be planned in accordance with need as 
assessed by local authorities. The Government's belief in market 
principles is reflected in the deregulation of local bus services 
and in the introduction of the requirement for car parking 
facilities to be self-financing and, where possible, provided by 
the private sector. In addition, moves are being made by the 
Government to promote involvement of the private sector in the 
construction of new roads and in urban rapid transit systems with 
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user charges playing an increasing role in the financing of 
investment. These moves involve an increase in the role of 
consumer's demand in the determination of the requirement for 
urban transport services and facilities at the expense of the 
role of the needs of local communities as assessed by elected 
local authorities. 
There is considerable opposition amongst many urban authorities 
to the Government's moves to introduce market principles in urban 
transport. Such opposition has a basis in economic arguments 
concerning 'market faliure' primarily in situations where there 
are substantial 'externalities' and such arguments lie behind the 
notion that the integrated and co-ordinated planning of land use 
and transport development in urban areas should be undertaken by 
local authorities in order to achieve a socially efficient use 
of resources. Additional support for such an approach is 
provided if equity considerations are introduced relating to the 
provision for the needs of those who have insufficient resources 
to participate adequately in the market. This perspective, in 
fact, underpinned the move towards integrated local transport 
planning during the late 1960s and early 1970s manifested in the 
1968 Transport Act and the introduction of the TPP/TSG system in 
1975. As indicated above it provides the basis for criticism of 
the 1983 Transport Act and the reform of the TPP/TSG system from 
1985/86 as eroding the capacity for local authorities to 
formulate integrated and co-ordinated plans for the development 
of local transport services and facilities to meet the perceived 
needs of the communities they represent, in which public 
transport in particular can be supported to achieve objectives 
expressing the broader economic and social welfare of those 
communities. 
The resolution of this 'market versus planning' dimension of the 
conflict is only partly a 'technical* matter. Thus, it is 
possible to analyse the effect of the introduction of market 
approaches to the solution of urban transport problems in terms 1 
of defined objectives relating to efficiency and equity 
considerations. However, in our view the dispute is again 1 
ultimately based upon conflict between belief systems within 
broader world-views which are largely impervious to empirical 
refutation: it is basically a question of ideology. 102 
Therefore, in considering the way forward to achieving a more 
effective approach to addressing local transport problems and 
needs, we come up against a fundamental difference in perspective 
which can be seen as underpinning tension in central-local 
relations but which confounds objective resolution. Two 
conflicting belief-systems are involved. The first 'central 
versus local' conflict concerns beliefs about the desirable 
balance between central government control and local government 
autonomy and discretion. The second 'market versus planning' 
conflict concerns beliefs about the desirable balance between the 
role of consumers' demand in the market as opposed to assessments 
of need by elected local authorities in the provision of lcoal 
transport facilities and services. 
Although it would be erroneous to attribute to local government 
a uniform perspective or set of beliefs, it is nevertheless 
probably valid to characterise local government as having an 
interest in preserving the maximum degree of local autonomy and 
discretion in resource allocation decisions and in promoting 
local planning to meet needs as opposed to market approaches to 
service provision. There would, however, be some dispute between 
authorities on the latter dimension relating to the local 
authorities' role in service delivery as opposed to service 
planning. Nevertheless, there is a real basis for continuing 
tension and conflict between central and local government which 
will obstruct moves to improve effectiveness in the treatment of 
local transport problems. Our view of a desirable approach to 
the road maintenance problem embodied, in effect, compromises by 
central and local government which assume some resolution of the 
'central versus local' dimension of conflict. More generally, 
it is our view that the effective treatment of local transport 
problems, especially in urban areas, requires a reinstatement of 
the concept of integrated and co-ordinated planning on the basis 
of need which assumes a balance on our two dimensions of conflict 
involving more 'local autonomy' and more 'planning for need' than 
is implied in the present policies of the Government. 
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Notes on Fisures 
General 
1. Deflation of expenditure data to constant prices in general 
has been effected using the GDP market price deflator except 
in the case of roads current expenditure where the DTp's 
maintenance and lighting price index has been used (data on 
these indices is published in 'Economic Trends' and 
'Transport Statistics Great Britain' HMSO). 
2. All data relates to local authorities in England. 
1. Outturn : outturn expenditure 
' PEWP I : expenditure provided for by the Government 
in the annual Public Expenditure White Paper 
IProvision' : a) up to 1984/85 expenditure accepted by the 
DTp for TSG support 
b) since 1985/86 grant-related expenditure 
(GRE) for current expenditure on passenger 
transport 
'TPP Bid1 : sum of local authoritiesf bid expenditures 
for TSG submitted in annual TPPs 
'PEL' : ProtectedExpenditureLevels specifiedbythe 
Secretary of State forthemetropolitan areas 
under the terms of the 1983 Transport Act 
2. Figures since 1985/86 exclude expenditure by London Regional 
Transport which took over responsibility for public 
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3. Sources : a) CIPFA Highway and Transportation 
Statistics 1979/80-1984/85 
b) Dept of Environment GRE 'Green Books' 
1985/86-1987/88 
c) Data supplied by Dept of Transport 
d) H.M. Treasury (1981-1988) 
Fiaure 2 
1. See note 1 to Figure 1; as regards 'provision' the relevant 
GRE is the sum of normal and winter maintenance and street 
lighting. 
2. Source : See note 3 to Figure 1 
Fiaure 3 
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1. Other : expenditure on ports, airports and urban 
programme 
'LRT' : investment expenditure (including renewals) 
by London Regional Transport 
'Pub Trans' : expenditure on public transport by local 
authorities only including grants to British 
Rail for rolling stock renewal in the 
metropolitan areas and, from 1986/87, 
excluding internally-generated capital 
financing by bus undertakings 
Roads : construction and improvement of local 
authority roads; includes car parking in 
1981/82, 1982/83 and 1987/88 
2. Source : H.M. Treasury (1981-1988) 
Fiqure 4 
1. 'TSG Major' : accepted expenditure on major works (>f lm) 
eligible for TSG support since 1985/86 
ITSG Minor' : accepted expenditure on minor works (<Elm) 
eligible for TSG support since 1985/86 
'Non TSG1 : provision through capital allocation for 
expenditure on schemes not eligible for TSG 
support since 1985/86 
2. Source : data provided by Dept of Transport 
Fiqure 5 
1. Data in each local authority class relate to those 
authorities submitting returns to CIPFA as follows: 
'LBC's' : London Borough Councils (23 out of 33 incl 
City) 
'MDC's' : Metropolitan District Councils (30 out of 36) 
'SCC's' : Shire County Councils (38 out of 39) 
2. Source : Chartered ,Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, CIPFA (1988) 
Fiqure 6 
1. This figure compares roads expenditure with capital 
allocation and TSG - accepted expenditure in 1986/87 and 
1987/88 for the total sample of authorities included in the 
study (see note 4 on text). 
2. Expenditure data is outturn in 1986/87 (86/87EX) and budget 
in 1987/88 (87/8BD). 
.e. . 
- 
3. 'TSG Major' : expenditure on major works (>Elm) eligible 
for TSG support 
INon TSG Alloc8: 
INon TSG Offer1: 
4. Source 
1. For 
definitions : 
2. Source 
expenditure on minor works (<flm) eligible 
for TSG support 
expenditure on schemes not eligible for TSG 
support within the roads capital allocation 
expenditure on non-TSG works in excess of 
roads capital allocation. 
data provided by Dept of Transport and by 
individual authorities. 
see note 1 to Figure 1 and Figure 2 
see note 3 to Figure 1 
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